WEST COAST MOTORS Vs. DISTRICT MAGISTRATE ERNAKULAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The writ petition is by the West Coast Motors, Mattancherry, a company engaged in motor transport industry, under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking to quash, by a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, the order, dated 2nd December 1958 of the District Magistrate, Ernakulam acting as the authority under the Minimum Wages Act, Central Act XI of 1948. The 1st respondent is the District Magistrate and the 2nd respondent is the General Secretary of the Cochin Motor Transport Labour Congress, Edacochi. The 2nd respondent, on behalf of fourteen employees in the petitioner company, filed an application under S.20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act on 13th March 1956 before the 1st respondent claiming payment of overtime wages. The amount claimed in the petition was Rs. 4,548 on the basis that the workers concerned had worked for 720 hours overtime during the six months preceding the date of application. The petitioner filed a written statement, dated 28th April, 1956, in which, among other things, an objection was raised that the claim petition did not disclose the details of individual claims. In answer to this objection the 2nd respondent filed a clarifying statement on 26th September 1956, wherein the amount of Rs. 4,548 and 720 hours of overtime were re-affirmed. Thereafter, evidence was recorded in the case and on 10th October 1957 the 2nd respondent filed a petition with a prayer to direct the petitioner to produce certain records like the register of wages, the register showing overtime payments and wage slips. The petitioner took time for the production of the aforesaid records and finally on 29th October, 1957 stated that the petitioner company was not in possession of the records concerned. Thereafter, the examination of witnesses continued and on 21st May 1958 the 1st respondent directed the petitioner company to file a statement regarding the exact hours during which the employees worked with other necessary details. On 3rd July 1958 the petitioner filed such a statement. Thereafter, on 17th September 1958, the 2nd respondent filed the petition for amending the original claim petition, which was opposed by the petitioner company. Ultimately the 1st respondent by his order, dated 2nd December 1958, allowed the amendment, whereby the figures regarding the relief claimed and the hours of overtime were allowed to be amended from Rs. 4,548 to Rs. 20,372-8-0 and from 720 hours to 1,080 hours respectively. The writ petition seek to vacate this order of amendment and the case comes before us as it has been referred to a Division Bench by a learned Judge of this Court.

(2.) We would at the outset dispose of a minor contention raised by the learned advocate of the 2nd respondent. It has been urged by him that the Authority constituted under the Minimum Wages Act is a court and therefore, a writ under Art.226 of the Constitution is incompetent. But it may be noted that the writ petition has been filed under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution and it cannot be seriously disputed that this court has jurisdiction under Art.227 to interfere with the orders of inferior courts in appropriate cases. Therefore, this contention has no force.

(3.) Coming to the more important question regarding the merits of the application for amendment, the petitioners learned advocate contends that the order of the 1st respondent is arbitrary, illegal and erroneous on the face of the record and therefore, liable to be quashed. The first proviso to S.20(2) of the Minimum Wages Act lays down that every application under the said sub-section shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable. The second proviso enacts that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months, when applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Power or jurisdiction appears to have been exercised by the 1st respondent under the latter proviso, and we think rightly, to grant the amendment. Therefore, the objection of the learned advocate of the petitioner that the Authority has no power or jurisdiction under the Act to grant the amendment has to be repelled. But that power is to be exercised only when the applicant satisfies the Authority that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period of six months. The question therefore, for decision in this writ petition is whether the 2nd respondent so satisfied the Authority and if not, whether the error committed by the 1st respondent is an error apparent on the face of the record to call for interference by this Court under Art.226 and 227 of the Constitution. In this connection, it may be relevant to refer to the material portion of the impugned order and we would therefore extract hereinafter Para.5 of the order: