STATE Vs. PARADESI PERUMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is brought on behalf of the State from the order of acquittal made by learned Sessions Judge of Nagercoil in Criminal Appeal No. 24/1950. The appeal in the court below was from the judgment of the Stationary First Class Magistrate of Kottar in C.C. 892/1124. There were three accused persons who were prosecuted under S.56 of the Travancore Act IV of 1095. The case against them was that on 28.11.1124 they marched along the public road from Ethankad to Thekke Thamarakulam shouting slogans through a megaphone. There was a notification issued by the District Superintendent of Police on 6.11.1947 under S.24(e) of the Police Act prohibiting the use of megaphones in any of the public streets in Trivandrum District except under a permit or licence obtained from a competent authority. The three accused persons were alleged to have acted in contravention of this notification. They were all three of them convicted by the Trial Court and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 25 each. In default of payment of fine, they were directed to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. From the conviction and sentence, the 2nd accused alone appealed to the Sessions Court of Nagercoil. The learned Sessions Judge held in appeal that the notification was not warranted by law and that therefore the accused could not be held to be guilty. He accordingly set aside the conviction and sentence and directed the fine, if recovered should be refunded to the 2nd accused appellant before him. From this order of acquittal the State has brought the present appeal as already stated. The contention urged on behalf of the State by the learned Public Prosecutor is that the view taken by the lower appellate court is erroneous and that the District Superintendent of Police was justified in publishing the notification. Consequently the accused who contravened the terms of the notification was properly convicted and punished by the Trial Court.

(2.) The notification was published under S.24(e) of Travancore Act IV of 1095. According to this Section the Commissioner or the District Superintendent may subject to any rule or order which may at any time be legally made or any licence granted by any Magistrate or other authority duly empowered in this behalf...... regulate and control music, the beating of drums, tom toms and other instrument and the blowing or sounding of horns or other noisy instruments in any street or any public place other than public buildings and the precincts thereof. The notification published by the District Superintendent of Police, Trivandrum was worded as follows:

(3.) It is contended on behalf of the State by the learned Public Prosecutor that in the present case the notification does not totally prohibit the doing of any particular act. What it says is that no noise of the kind specified in the notification shall be made in a public street, except under any rule or order legally made or under a license granted by any Magistrate or other authority duly empowered in this behalf. The concluding words of this notification take the case out of the category of notifications totally prohibiting the doing of the act. If any person wants to talk through a megaphone while using a public road he can do so if he gets a license or permit from a Magistrate or competent authority empowered to grant such a license or permit. This does not amount to a total prohibition but come under the category of regulating which is the word used in the relevant section. The power conferred upon a Magistrate to grant permits or licenses is to be found in S.23 of the (Travancore) Act IV of 1095. According to this provision, the District Magistrate with the previous sanction of the Government, is invested with the power to make rules not inconsistent with the Act for regulating traffic of all kinds in streets and public places and the use of streets and public places by persons riding, driving, cycling, walking or leading or accompanying cattle so as to prevent danger, obstruction or inconvenience to the public. This provision would include the power of granting a permit or license to speak through a megaphone while using a public road. The power conferred upon the District Magistrate is wide enough to include such acts and in the circumstances, we uphold the contentions of the learned Public Prosecutor that in the present case there is no total prohibition as imagined by the lower appellate court.