UKKAN CHAKKU THOMAS Vs. THOMOKUTTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under S.3(1) of the Cochin Contempt of Courts Act, XXXII of 1111, invoking this Courts jurisdiction to commit the twentynine respondents herein for contempt of the Court of the Second Class Magistrate, Trichur, on the ground that they held a meeting of the parishioners of the Trichur Chaldean Syrian Church in violation of an order passed by the said Court under S. 125 of the Cochin Criminal Procedure Code (S.144 of the Indian Code) prohibiting any such meeting. The petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof show that during recent years there started serious dissensions among the parishioners of the said Church and that they are now divided into two hostile camps. The petitioner belongs to one faction while most, if not all the respondents belong to the opposite faction. When the respondents wanted to call together a meeting to decide certain questions affecting the church and issued the necessary notices in that behalf seven priests who apparently belong to the opposite faction petitioned the Second Class Magistrate Trichur to prohibit the holding of the meeting and also warned him that unless that was done there will be serious breach of the peace. The Magistrate after calling for a report from the police issued an order under S.125, Criminal Procedure Code, prohibiting the convening of the meeting. It is alleged that notice of that order was given to some of the parishioners and that a copy of the notice was affixed in a conspicuous place in the Church premises. The petitioners complaint is that notwithstanding the prohibitory order the respondents actually held a meeting to which the members of the opposite faction were excluded, it is alleged, with the active support of responsible police officers stationed at Trichur. The Magistrates order prohibiting the meeting was passed on 5.1.1125 and the meeting itself was to be held on the same day. This petition was filed on 16.3.1125 when more than two months had elapsed after the incident complained of.

(2.) One of us before whom the petition first came up for hearing referred the matter to a Division Bench after obtaining a report from the Magistrate regarding the incident. The Division Bench before whom the petition was first posted directed notices to be issued on the petition to the respondents and to the State. After the respondents and the State entered appearance the petition came up for hearing before another Division Bench when the Public Prosecutor and counsel for respondents raised a preliminary objection that under S.3(3) of the Cochin Contempt of Courts Act the matter had to be heard by a Division Court of three Judges. The petitioners Counsel contended that the provision contained was impliedly repealed by S.21 (vii of the Travancore-Cochin High Court Act, V of 1125 and that under that provision it was competent for a Division Court of two Judges to hear the petition. As the point appeared to be important the petition was referred to a Full Bench for decision, and direction as to whether a Bench of three Judges or a Bench of two Judges should hear the matter. In due course this Bench was constituted and when the Petition came up for hearing before us there was a change in the personnel of Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. Ramanan who now appears for the petitioner withdrew the argument that it was within the competence of a Division Court of two Judges to hear and dispose of the matter. All the Counsel appearing in the case now agree that a Bench of three Judges alone has competence to deal with the petition. In these circumstances we then and there intimated Counsel that we did not propose to decide the question of the implied repeal of S.3(3) of Contempt of Courts Act on this occasion but that we shall deal with the petition itself.

(3.) At that stage Mr. Ramanan wanted the petition to be posted for evidence to prove that all the 29 respondents openly defied the Magistrates order and thereby brought themselves within the mischief of the Cochin Contempt of Courts Act. Regard being had to all the circumstances and the contents of the records called for from the Magistrates Court we feel far from satisfied that we should further enquire into this matter. In a case where the party really aggrieved had an alternative remedy we cannot find sufficient justification for three Judges of this Court devoting their time and labour in an enquiry to establish the necessary facts to warrant the committal of the respondents for contempt, especially when the Magistrate concerned or his immediate superior, the District Magistrate has not chosen to move this Court. Before we proceed to set out further reasons why we have decided to exercise our discretion that way we must advert to a preliminary point.