SHAJI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE common question for consideration in the above cases is whether the trial court was justified in granting time to the prosecution to let in evidence after a period of three years from the date of framing the charge in view of the direction of the Supreme Court in the clarification judgment in Raj Deo Sharma's case 2000 (1) KLT 463 (SC) = (1999 SCC (Crl.)1324 ).

(2.) THE petitioner in Crl. M. C. 795/2000 and 830/2000 is the same. Two cases were charge sheeted against him by the C. B. I, alleging the commission of offences under Ss. 420, 468 and 471 IPC and those cases were taken to the file as C. C. 1342/94 and C. C. 1343/94 respectively before the addl. Chief judicial Magistrate's Court (Economic Offences), Ernakulam. THE charge was framed in both the cases on 18,9. 95. In C. C. 1342/94 (Crl. M. C. 795/2000), six witnesses were examined as PWs. 1 to 6 whereas PW. 1 was partly examined in c. C. 1343/94. THEreafter the accused filed Cri. M. P. 1180/99 in C. C. 1342/94 and m. P. 995/99 in C. C. 1343/94 for closing the prosecution evidence, in view of the directions of the Supreme Court in the first Raj Deo Sharma's case AIR 1998 SC 3281 =1999 (1) KLT 173 (SC ). THE above petitions were allowed by the Court below as per order dated 6. 4. 1999 and the prosecution evidence was closed. THEreafter the Supreme Court issued the clarification judgment in Raj Deo sharma's case reported in 2000 (1) KLT 463 (SC ). In view of the above decision, the prosecution filed Cri. M. P. 20739/99 in C. C. 1342/94 and Cri. M. P. 20741/99 in c. C. 1343/94. THE Court below relying on the clarification judgment issued by the Supreme Court, allowed the above petitions as per order dated 21. 1. 2000 and granted extension of time for the prosecution to let in evidence. Aggrieved by the above orders, the accused filed Crl. M. C. 795/2000 and 830/2000 for quashing the above proceedings invoking S. 482 Cr. P. C.

(3.) IN all the three cases, the accused filed petitions for closing the prosecution evidence and to proceed to the next step in accordance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma's case 1999 (1) KLT 173 (SC) _ (AIR 1998 SC 3281 ). The above petitions were allowed as the period of two years had elapsed since the framing of the charge. On 22. 9. 99, the Supreme Court made the clarification judgment in Raj Deo sharma's case 2000 (1) KLT 463 (SC) wherein it was held that an additional period of one year can be claimed by the prosecution in respect of prosecutions which are pending on the date of the judgment in the main appeal. One of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that the period of one year extended as per the above direction of the Supreme Court would start from the expiry of the period of two years contemplated in the earlier judgment, whereas the learned standing counsel for the C. B. I, argued that the extension of period of time of one year would start from the date of the judgment of the main appeal i. e. from 8. 10. 98. The direction of the Supreme court on the above aspect is in para 15 of the judgment which reads : "shri. Altaf Ahmad, learned Additional Solicitor general submitted that unless directions Nos. (i) and (iii) are made prospective from the date of judgment in Raj Deo Sharma, 1998 AIR SCW 3208: AIR 1998 SC 3281:1998 Crl. LJ4596, prosecution in many pending cases would be jeopardised. He pointed out that on the date of the said judgment the period concerned stood expired in many cases. We have bestowed our consideration on the said submission and we find force in it. Possibility of miscarriage of justice resulting therefrom must be averted. We are, therefore, inclined to include a rider that an additional period of one year can be claimed by the prosecution in respect of prosecutions which were pending on the date of judgment in the main appeal, and the Court concerned would be free to grant such extension if the Court considers it necessary in the interest of administration of criminal justice. As we suspended the operation of the judgment from 14. 5. 1999 till today the said time of suspension will stand excluded from the aforementioned additional period of one year". A reading of para 15 of the judgment would leave no room for any doubt regarding the starting point of the extended period of one year and would clearly direct that the period of extension would start from the date of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the main appeal on 8. 10. 98 and not from the date of expiry of the period of two years from the date of framing of the charge. It was intended to avert the possibility of any miscarriage of justice caused as a result of the earlier direction and to grant a further time of one year to let in evidence. The same is made further clear by the Supreme court in providing that the period of suspension of the operation of the judgment from 14. 5. 99 also should be excluded in computing the additional period of one year and hence the above argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted.