BABY ALIAS MARIAMMA PAUL Vs. DEVASSY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed questioning the judgment and decree delivered in A. S. No. 101 of 1993 on the file of the 1st Additional Sub Judge, Ernakulam. That appeal was filed against the judgment and decree in O. S. No. 561 of 1985 on the file of the 2nd Additional Munsiff, Ernakulam, Plaintiff is the appellant. In both the courts below the plaintiff was not successful.

(2.) Appellant as plaintiff filed the above said suit for perpetual injunction restraining the deceased first defendant, one Devassy, from causing any obstruction to the appellant's free egress and ingress to the plaint schedule property and from attempting to trespass into the plaint schedule property and also for a mandatory injunction to remove the obstruction caused for entering the plaint schedule property from the lane through the gate. First defendant died pending appeal and his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents in this appeal. The case of the appellant in short is that the suit property measuring 8 cents in extent was purchased under Ext. A - 2 (copy), dated 17th July 1969 with specific boundaries and it has got pucca compound walls on all sides. There is an iron gate at the east of the southern wall. Deceased first respondent unauthorisedly constructed a hut on the south of the suit property in puramboke land which lies north of the road, blocking the entry of the appellant to the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the above said suit was filed

(3.) Suit was resisted by the deceased first respondent with the contentions that he started to reside in the southern property from the year 1967 onwards prior to Ext. A - 2 sale deed. At that time there was only a fence on the southern boundary of the plaint schedule property. Only after the purchase, the appellant put up the compound walls. She put up the gate in order to trouble the deceased first respondent. Since it is a puramboke land the Corporation alone is entitled to remove the first respondent from the place and he was not causing any obstruction for the appellant's egress and ingress to the plaint schedule property. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. In both the courts, as pointed out above, the appellant did not succeed.