FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA Vs. KUTTAPPAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE common issue arising for consideration in these revision petitions is: whether the application of the respondent under S. 16 (1)of the Arbitration Act (for short THE Act) is barred by limitation.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner present the case thus: On 25-10-1988 the respondent's counsel, to whom the arbitrator had forwarded the award and the connected files, filed the award in court and gave the petitioners herein the notice of filing on 26-10-1988. THE respondent in the circumstances must be held to have received the notice under S. 14 (2) of the arbitration Act on 25-10-1988 itself. Since the application under S. 16 of THE act was filed after 30 days of the said date, the same is barred by limitation.

(3.) ACCORDING to Article 119 of The Limitation Act, the period of limitation for an application under S. 16 (1) of the Arbitration Act to remit the award begins to run from the date of service of notice of the filing of the award. Art. 119 of the Limitation Act (leaving out necessary parts thereof) reads: Description of suits. Period of Time from which period limitation. begins to run. 119. Under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (a) (b) for the setting Thirty days. The date of service of aside an award the notice of the or getting an filing of the award, award remitted for re-consideration. In order to appreciate the content of this provision it is necessary to understand the meaning of the words date of service of notice'. Construing these words, the Supreme Court has observed that there is no need to have a notice in writing served in a formal manner. When the Legislature used the word 'notice' it must be presumed to have borne in mind that it means not only a formal intimation but also an informal one. (Seenilkanta v. Kashinath, air 1962 S. C. 666 ). Alongside we should keep in mind the importance of the content of S. 14 (2) of The Act also. The learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard argues that in a case where a party, who is already aware of the filing of the award, appears in the case and applies to the court for leave to file' objection, a service of notice of the filing of the award within the meaning of S. 14 (2) of the Act becomes unnecessary. In such a case, it is further contended that even if the court fails to give notice to him, the date when he enters appearance in the proceedings will be treated as the date of the service of notice of the filing of the award. An application filed beyond 30 days from such date will be barred under Art. 119 of The Limitation Act. The above argument of the learned counsel is well founded in the light of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bhola Nath v. Mahadev (AIR 1952 cal. 226 ). The decision of the Patna High Court in State v. Liason & contracts, AIR 1983 Pat. 101 also has taken a similar view. The ratio of this decision no more to my mind, reflects the correct law in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. v. Raunaq & co. Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 1988 S. C. 2054 ). The Supreme Court after a review of the case law on the subject has stated thus:- "the fact that the parties have notice of the filing of the award, is not enough. The notice must be-served by the Court. We reiterate again that there must be (a) filing of the award in the proper Court; (b) service of the notice by the Court or its office to the parties concerned; and (c) such notice need not necessarily be in writing. It is upon the date of service of such notice that the period of limitation begins and as at present under the Act, the limitation expires on the expiry of the thirty days of the service of that notice for an application for setting aside of the award. The importance of the matter, which need be emphasized is the service of the notice by the Court. It is not the method of the service that is important or relevant". (Emphasis supplied) t -j The ruling of the Supreme Court in Nilkantha's case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners to sustain his argument, in my view, has not struck a different note. It is clear from the said decision that the notice contemplated under sub-section (2) of S. 14, though not necessary to be in writing, shall be served on the party by the Registry, and within thirty days from the date of such service the petition to set aside the award of remitting the award shall be filed. The Supreme Court there has stated that the communication of the information to the pleader of the party by the court that an award has been filed is sufficient compliance with the requirements of sub-section 2 of S. 14 with , j respect to the giving of the notice to the parties concerned about the filing of the award. *j That means, the party who wants to sustain the plea of bar of limitation shall establish that the application under S. 16 of The Act or an application under S. 30 to set aside the award was filed more than 30 days from the date of receipt of the communication to the party from the court. 5 Considered in the tight of the afore priacipates, (tie appticadaa of (tie respondent under S. 16 (1) of The Act cannot be said to be barred by limitation. It is relevant in this context to take note of the admitted fact discernible from the statements of facts contained in the memorandum of revision petition namely, "it may be noted that the respondent herein had no case that a notice was issued from court and that he had received it". The CR. Ps. for the reasons stated above, are liable to be dismissed. ACCORDINGly they, are dismissed. But in the circumstances no order as to costs. . .