UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO LTD Vs. PADMAVATHY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question raised in this appeal has some moment for victims in motor accidents. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the New Act") came into force on 1-7-1989 containing S.140 in which the amount of compensation for "liability without fault" in accident cases has been fixed at twenty five thousand rupees in respect of death and twelve thousand rupees in respect of permanent disablement. The question raised is this: Whether the victim (or his legal representatives) in a motor accident which happened before the said date is entitled to compensation as provided in the New Act Some of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals in this State have awarded compensation according to the amount fixed in the New Act and appeals have been filed against such awards in which the aforesaid question alone has been raised. When we heard arguments in this appeal, we had the assistance of arguments addressed by some of the standing counsel engaged by Insurance Companies in this High Court. Besides the counsel for victim/respondent in this appeal, we are also benefited by the able assistance provided by Shri. V. Giri whose services were requested for by us as amicus curiae. We place on record our gratitude to all the counsel.

(2.) The motor accident in this case took place on 20-11-1988. The claim was preferred by the legal representative of the victim of the motor accident claiming compensation under S.110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short 'the repealed Act'). During the pendency of proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, a claim was made under S.92 A of the repealed Act for compensation under "no fault liability". The Claims Tribunal by an interim award granted twenty five thousand rupees as per S.140 of the New Act. The contention of the appellant, who is the insurer, is that since the accident happened before the New Act came into force, the amount under "no fault liability" should not have been in excess of what is provided in S.92A of the repealed Act.

(3.) Before we proceeded to hear the merits of the appeal, a preliminary objection was raised against maintainability of the appeal. Shri. James Vincent, learned counsel appearing for a similar claimant in another appeal, contended that no appeal will lie against an interim award. S.173 of the New Act (which corresponds to S.110(D) of the repealed Act) provides for appeals. The said provision says that any person "aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court". S.173, thus, confers a right of appeal against "an award of a Claims Tribunal". The word "award" is not, of course, defined either in the New Act or in the repealed Act. Hence it has to be given its ordinary meaning. To award ordinarily means "to adjudge to be due or by judicial determination or deliberate judgment" (Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar) Compensation for "no fault liability" was envisaged in S.92A of the repealed Act and in S.140 of the New Act. S.141(2) of the New Act which is identical with S.92(b)(2) of the repealed Act reads thus: "A claim for compensation under S.140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such death or permanent disablement under S.140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under S.140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place". The section evidently recognises two types of claims. The corollary thereto is that there can be two types of awards. One is the claim for compensation for "no fault liability" (under S.140) and the other is the claim based on fault of the opposite side. The statute enjoins on the Claims Tribunal to dispose of both the claims independently, one first in time and the other next. This means, two awards may have to be passed by the Claims Tribunal in favour of one claimant in the same proceedings arising from one accident S.168 of the New Act deals with "award" of the Claims Tribunal. Sub-section (1) mentions of disposal of the application made under . S.166 and its proviso deals with disposal of the application made under S.140. Sub-section (2) says that the Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties. Sub-section (3) says that "when an award is made under this Section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct". It is thus clear that a claim under S.140 must also be disposed of through an award. Such an award can be passed only after the opposite party or parties concerned filed their written statements or objections or at least after affording a reasonable opportunity to them to file their written statement and after hearing them. The Claims Tribunal must be satisfied that conditions specified in S.140 have been substantiated to make an award under the section. In this view, we have no doubt that the Claims Tribunal has to pass an award under S.140. Hence an appeal is maintainable under S.173. The preliminary objection is overruled.