PHILIP Vs. MATHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) S. 30 of the Act enumerates the grounds on which an award could be set aside S. 33 of the Act enables a party to challenge the existence or validity of an agreement and the consequent award. The limitation prescribed for such an application is 30 days from the receipt of notice of the filing of the award in Court, under Art. 158 of the Limitation Act (old), corresponding to Art. 119 (b) of the new Act. According to the petitioner, what he seeks is not to set aside the award under the grounds enumerated in S. 30 of the Act, but a declaration that the agreement does not exist and consequently that the award is a nullity. According to him, the case is not governed by art. 119 but is governed by the residuary Art. 137, which provides for a period of three years. The respondents on the other hand contend that the petition from which this appeal arises is barred by the decision of this Court in A. S. No. 61 of 1974 and that in any case the application under S. 33 is not maintainable when a decree in terms of the award has been passed

(2.) THERE is divergence of opinion among various High courts as to whether an application to set aside an award is to be made under s. 30 or under S. 33 of the Act. Some Courts hold the view that an application can be filed only under S. 33 and that S 30 enumerates only the grounds on which an award can be attacked. Some other Courts are of the view that S 30 also enables a party to file an application. I shall refer to some of the decisions cited at the bar.

(3.) IN A R. Savkur versus Amritlal Kalidas (AIR. 1954 bombay 293), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that all applications to set aside an "award" have to be filed under S. 33 and not under S. 30 and to the only application so contemplated, Art. 158 of the limitation Act applied. The finding here therefore is that even for an application challenging the existence of the agreement the limitation would be 30 days as prescribed in Art. 158 of the Limitation Act.