VASU Vs. THANKAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) To quote the words of the learned Munsiff in the order under revision;

(2.) The complaint before the learned Munsiff was that the defendant in the suit against whom there was an order of injunction in force during the pendency of the suit had violated such order. The significant fact is that the violation was said to be in the year 1976 and the petition for taking action for such violation was moved by the plaintiff on 16-2-1978. The suit in which the injunction was sought was dismissed by the Munsiff on 25-2-1978. It was long after such dismissal and while such dismissal was in force that the court below passed the impugned order. It is therefore evident that at the time the order for imprisonment was passed there was no question of the defendant continuing to disobey any order of injunction since that had ceased to be in force on 25-2-1978. I am mentioning this to indicate that it was not as a measure to compel compliance with any order that the order for imprisonment was passed it was intended and intended only as a punishment for some past act of the defendant.

(3.) The powers of the Civil Court to take action for disobedience of order of injunction are contained in O.21 R.32 of the Civil Procedure Code and O.39 R.2A of the Civil Procedure Code. O.21 R.32 deals, inter alia, with a case where a decree for injunction has been passed and the person who is bound by the decree wilfully fails to obey. In other words, that arises in a case where there is a decree which calls for enforcement. That is not the case here O.39 R.2A deals with consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction passed not by the final decree in the suit but on an interlocutory application. In case of disobedience of any injunction or other order made under R.1 or R.2 of O.39 the Court granting the injunction or making the order or the Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred is empowered to attach the property of the defaulting party and also to detain such party in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months. Sub-r.(2) of R.2A indicates that the attachment itself is only for the purpose of compelling obedience, for it provides that the attachment shall not remain in force for more than one year at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues the property attached could be sold. In other words, if the disobedience does not continue by the time one year has passed there is no adverse consequence to the party. Attachment automatically ceases. Therefore attachment would not operate as an expropriatory measure or as a penal measure. In that setting detention in civil prison must also be held to be not intended as a penal measure but as a mode of enforcement of the injunction order. That is so is indicated by the Supreme Court in the decision in The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221 . In Para.23 of the judgment the court observes: