LAWS(KER)-1980-11-42

JACOB GEORGE Vs. AGRICULTURAL INCOME TAX OFFICER

Decided On November 21, 1980
JACOB GEORGE Appellant
V/S
AGRL. INCOME-TAX OFFICER Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only contention urged before me against the impugned orders Exts. P1, P2, P5 and P8 is that those orders were made outside the period of limitation prescribed under S.41(4) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950. The impugned orders have been made under the Revenue Recovery Act on the basis of a certificate issued under S.41(3) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act. Sub-s.(4) of S.41 says that no proceeding for recovery of any sum due under the Act shall be commenced after the expiry of three years from the latest day fixed for payment in the notice of demand served under S 30. The notice of demand was served subsequent to the assessment order dated 10-12-1963 for the years 1959-60 and 1960-61. The certificate under sub-s.(3) of S.41 was issued on 2-6-1964. Accordingly the certificate was issued well within the time mentioned under sub-s.(4) of S.41. There is no dispute about these dates However, the petitioners counsel contends that the impugned orders which were made under the Revenue Recovery Act were made long past the period of limitation prescribed under the Agricultural Income Tax Act. It is true. But the limitation prescribed under sub-s.(4) of S.41 is attracted only by the order commencing proceedings for recovery. That order is the certificate issued under sub-s.(3) of S.41. It is that certificate which commences recovery proceedings, although the recovery as such is made by recourse to the machinery under the Revenue Recovery Act. Consequently if, as in the instant case, the certificate was issued within the three years prescribed under S.41(4) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, proceedings for recovery can thereafter continue even beyond three years. In the present case proceedings were delayed and protracted owing to proceedings in court. It was for that reason that recovery could not be had for many years. The recovery has still not been made owing to the present proceedings. All this delay could have been avoided if the petitioner had not caused the delay by contentions based on technicalities. I see no merits in the petitioner's contentions. The O. P. is dismissed. No costs.