PUTHOOR RAWATHAR Vs. DEVASIA CHACKO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) LANDLORD in rent control proceedings is the revision petitioner. A shop room was let out to the Ist respondent tenant in 1961 apparently for the purpose of carrying on business in aluminium/brass/copper vessels. The petition for eviction was filed in 1975, and by this time the tenant had proposed and expanded his business. He had put up a three (or four)storeyed building very near the shop room in question, and had obtained possession of some other premises also. The Rent Control Court found that apart from the multi-storeyed structure where the tenant was carrying on business in the name and style of " Ambadan Vessels Palace ", he was in possession of two other buildings or rooms in the same municipality, besides godowns attached to his residence, and a factory building near the Railway over-bridge. Analysing the Commission reports (Exts Cl and C2), the evidence of the commissioner and the admissions made by the tenant himself as C. P. W. I, the court came to the conclusion that the business as such was actually being carried on from the ground floor of the "palace", and that the shop room in question was being used only for storage purposes. Thus it held that the tenant was in possession of a building "reasonably sufficient for his requirements" within the meaning of S. 11 (4) (iii) of Act 2/65 and on that ground, ordered eviction.

(2.) THE Appellate Authority however took a different view. It relied on two circumstances noticed by the Commissioner, Viz. , (i) the wall of the shop room in question was painted blue; and (ii) aluminium vessels were seen hung from the ceiling; to infer that the room was not being used for storage, but for "display of articles". A stray sentence in Ext. C2 also indicated that the tenant was using both the ground floor of the place and the shop room in question for carrying on trade. Adverting to these and other circumstances, the Appellate authority held that the tenant's expanded business could not be carried on without the disputed shop room also. Godowns, factory, storage rooms and display facilities were all necessary for a business of the type and magnitude the tenant was carrying on, and if possession of the shop room were to be given up the rest of the accommodation would not be reasonably sufficient. THE authority set aside the Rent Controller's order on the above basis, and dismissed the petition for eviction.

(3.) THE first contention of counsel for the petitioner landlord is that the Appellate Authority and the revisional court have both erred in construing S. 11 (4) (iii ). Obviously what they have taken into account for deciding whether the alternate accommodation available is reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirements, is the nature and size of the business which is now being carried on by him, and not its size and nature at the time the shop room was let out in 1961. S. 11 (4) (iii) speaks of a building which might have been in the possession of the tenant at the time of letting, or a building he may subsequently acquire. Suppose a tenant has in his possession a shop room with an area of 500 sq. ft ; but instead of doing business from that room, he takes out another of the same size on rent from a landlord and starts business. Going by the language of the Section, the landlord could apply the very next day for eviction on the ground that the tenant had an equally good room in his possession at the time of letting. In such a case, what could and would be taken note of is only the nature and size of the tenant's business at the time of letting. Can the position be different in a case of subsequent acquisition? In other words, is sufficiency to be determined with reference to the nature and size of the business the tenant had at the time of letting, i. e. by assessing the magnitude and nature of the business the tenant had intended to carry on when the room was taken on rent, or is to be determined by taking note of the business he is actually carrying on at the time of filing the rent control petition. This aspect has not been examined by the revisional court; it has simply assumed that the crucial date is the date of filing the petition, and not the date of letting. I think the question requires further examination. THE first part of clause (iii) and its bearing on the construction of the second part cannot totally be overlooked; nor could it be assumed, if the intention is to help the tenant, that his business would always flourish and expand.