(1.) THE Deputy Conservator of Forests, Nemmara is the petitioner in this writ petition where he challenges the validity of the order of the District Judge, Palghat in I. A. No.419 of 1979 in appeal filed under S.61D of the Kerala Forest Act (for short 'the Act'). A case of illicit transport of some timber logs in a taxi car was detected by the Beat guards of the Thiruvazhiyad Beat on 14-10-1978 at 2 a. m. near a culvert at Talipadarn road side. As the persons who were in the car did not produce any transport permit at the time of the detection of the offence when they were asked to produce the same it was reasonably suspected that the vehicle concerned was being used for the commission of an offence in respect of a forest produce. Consequently the vehicle was seized by the Beat guards along with the timber logs kept inside. After investigation and enquiry into the matter as empowered under the Act the petitioner passed an order dated 20-2-1979, a copy of which is marked in this case as Ext. P-1, confiscating, the car along with all its accessories and timber. Aggrieved by this order the first respondent filed an appeal before the District Court, Palghat under S.61D of the Act. Along with the appeal she also filed an interlocutory application requesting the Court to stay the operation of Ext. P-1 order till the disposal of the appeal. THE District Court passed an order in the following effect: "THE Deputy Conservator of Forests, Nemmara is directed to release the carlo the petitioner on executing a bond with 2 solvent sureties each in the sum of Rs. 10,000/-". A copy of the order has been marked as Ext. P-2.
(2.) IT is contended by the petitioner that this order is illegal and without jurisdiction and he seeks to quash the same. According to him, the District Court failed to note that there is no provision in the Act making any f revisions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable to a proceeding under any of the provisions of the Act. Therefore, neither S.151 nor O.41, R.5 of the Civil Procedure Code which had been invoked in the interlocutory application would be applicable. As per the provisions of the Act there is no power on the part of the Appellate Court to pass an interlocutory order in an appeal filed against an order of confiscation passed by a competent officer. The petitioner would, therefore, contend that the District Judge should not have passed an order on the application which is not based on any of the provisions of the Act. A further grievance of the petitioner is that the Court below has not incorporated sufficient conditions to safeguard the interest of the Government if ultimately the appeal happens to be dismissed.
(3.) THIS principle has been followed in many other decisions. Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekhara Thevar (AIR. 1948 PC. 12), Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao(AIR. 1916 P.C. 21) and National Sewing Thread Company Ltd. v James Chadwick & Bros. (AIR. 1953 SC. 357) are some of them. There-tore, it will not be correct to state as the petitioner seems to contend that S.151 and O.41 R.5 of the Civil Procedure Code will not be applicable. In any view of the matter the District Judge has got inherent jurisdiction to grant stay. It might be noted that S.151 does not confer any inherent rights on the Court It only says that the right of inherent jurisdiction which is already there in all Court is saved. Inherent jurisdiction is there even with Tribunals of limited jurisdiction.