LAWS(KER)-1970-7-3

N KRISHNA IYER Vs. LAKSHMI AMMAL

Decided On July 06, 1970
N. KRISHNA IYER Appellant
V/S
LAKSHMI AMMAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A matrimonial mess which stemmed out of a child marriage gone through in the twenties of this century is the theme of this litigation. A poor, small girl before her puberty was wedded to a poor teen age boy but there was no consummation, the young husband having left for Bombay unable to continue his studies, the promised pittance of a dowry not having been paid. Thus separated by economic estrangement, the bride and bridegroom lived apart even thereafter, the wife picking a living in a humble way and the husband making good as a clerk in Bombay and by sheer industrious habits rising to a relatively good position. Nature asserted itself, the man married another, had children by her and is settled well in life now. The first wife in the evening of her life having lost her parents and become near destitute, sued her husband for arrears of maintenance for the permissible period of three years and for future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 100 per mensem. The defendant husband taking advantage of the fact that a Hindu marriage is not recorded or registered, and in the hope that the long lapse of time would have obliterated evidence of their alliance, went to the extreme extent of denying the marital relationship and of course, challenged the quantum.

(2.) Instituted as a pauper suit in March 1965, the action actually came up for trial only in 1967. On 31-3-1967 the plaintiff was examined in chief and various documents, including Exts. P8 and P9, were marked. She spoke to her case, corroborated by these two exhibits. When the opportunity for cross examination arose, the advocate for the defendant moved for an adjournment which he got on condition of payment of day cost. On the adjourned date, viz., 6-4-1967, an application for adjournment was again made but was refused. The advocate and the party were absent and the suit was decreed as prayed fort An appeal was carried to the District Court unsuccessfully. The learned District Judge set out the facts and the story of adjournments ad libitum and felt that there was gross negligence in the conduct of the suit on the part of the defendant and no sufficient cause for his absence. He confirmed the decree of the Trial Court. Of course, Ext. P9, a rather important document in the case, was ignored by the learned District Judge on a wrong assumption that statements given to the Police should not be looked into. How can a narration by the husband to the police of his conjugal vicissitudes, containing clinching admissions, signed by him, come under any legal embargo if it were recorded not from an accused person nor in connection with any criminal investigation but on an interrogation in a curious petition by the neglected wife I mention this because only S.162 Crl. PC. and S.25 of the Evidence Act ordinarily ban the admissibility of statements given to the police, neither of which operates in the present 'case. The policeman like any other man can prove admissions made to him by a party if they are otherwise relevant and not excluded by statutory taboo. It is unfortunate that the learned District Judge has become a victim of the popular fallacy that statements to the Police are always tainted and universally inadmissible. The error is regrettable -- for a judge to commit. However, on the materials on record, the learned District Judge was satisfied that the decree was correct and, further more, that the defendant was ex parte without any valid cause.

(3.) The lame excuse that opportunity for leading evidence had "not been given to the appellant has only to be mentioned to be rejected. A trial once begun should go from day to day and long intervals spoil the total effect of the evidence and the ability of the judge to size up the credibility of the testimony. Long protraction after the evidence has commenced, as is manifest in this case, is a denial of fair trial and, therefore, of justice. I had recent occasion to observe that staggered recording of evidence spread over months is highly objectionable and in the Constitutions of countries, such as Cyprus, there is express prohibition of such a practice. Here is an observation of the Supreme Gouri of Cyprus which I may usefully extract: