(1.) The petitioners are timber merchants carrying on business within the Corporation of Trivandrum. S.126 of the Kerala Municipal Corporations Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) empowers the Corporation Council to levy a tax on timber brought into the city. That Section reads:
(2.) The Corporation of Trivandrum, the first respondent herein, issued a public notification, Ext. P1 dated 2-5-1967 under S.100(1) of the Act, stating that its Council at its meeting held on 29-3-1967 had resolved to impose and levy a tax on timber under S.126 at the rates mentioned therein, and inviting objections and suggestions, if any, to be made within one month for the consideration of the Council. This was followed by another notification, Ext. P2 dated 12-3-1968, by the Commissioner of the Corporation under S.100(2) of the Act stating that the Council had resolved at its meeting held on 13-2-1968 to impose and levy a tax on timber brought into the city under S.126 with effect from 1-4-1968 at the rates specified in the said notification. Ext. P3 dated 27-3-1969 is a bill issued by the Commissioner to one of the petitioners under S.126(1) of the Act demanding payment of a sum of Rs. 1300/- as timber tax. The petitioners contend that S.126 of the Act in unconstitutional, that the notification, Ext. P2, is violative of Art.14 of the Constitution, as it fixes a uniform rate of tax in respect of all timber, except bamboo, and that the proceedings for levy and collection of tax are unauthorised, as no legal machinery has been created under the Act for the said purpose. This writ petition has, therefore, been filed to quash Ext. P2 and the demand bills issued to the petitioners, and to direct the respondents, the second respondent being the State of Kerala to forbear from imposing, levying and collecting the tax under S.126 of the Act.
(3.) The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of S.126 of the Act in Jothi Timber Mart v. Calicut Municipality ( AIR 1970 SC 264 ). In the light of the above decision, counsel for the petitioners did not press the first point.