COCHIN DEVASWOM BOARD Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition to quash Ext. P. 3 dated July 1, 1959, an order passed by the Collector under the Cochin Land Acquisition Act (Act II of 1070), referred to hereafter as the 'act', by which, he refused to refer a land acquisition case to the District Court for decision. The award was passed by him on February 5, 1958 , and the application for reference was made on November 7, 1958 , and was rejected as barred by limitation. The material part of S. 17, sub-section (2), proviso (b) of the Act, which lays down the relevant rule of limitation runs as follows: "provided that every such application shall be made: [a ] It [b] "in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Peishkar under S. 11, sub-section [2], or within six months from the date of the Peishkar's award whichever period shall first expire". There is a moot question in this case, whether the notice issued to the petitioner on February 21, 1958, is a notice under S. 11 (2)within the meaning of the earlier part of the above provision; but it need not be decided, as, in my opinion, the application is out of time even under the latter part. A Division Bench of this Court in State of Travancore - Cochin v. Narayani Amma, Ponnamma (1958 K. L. T. 346) took the view, differing from that of the Madras High Court in Lakshmana Rao v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Ranipet (A. I. R. 1954 Madras 942) and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Seshachalam v. District Collector, Guntur (A. I. R. 1957 Andhra Pradesh 687) but in agreement with that of the Bombay High Court in Jahangir v. C. D. Gaikwad (A. I. R. 1954 bombay 419), the Allahabad High Court in Raja Harischandra v. Deputy Land acquisition Officer (A. I. R. 1957 Allahabad 112) and the Travancore-Cochin High court in Ravunni Nair v. The State of Travancore-Cochin (1954 K. L. T. 952) that "the date of the award, is not the date of the receipt of the notice thereof by the person making the application or the date on which he obtained knowledge or information about it", but is the "date of its filing in the Collector's office, and not the date on which the Collector has only written or signed it". I am bound by the above decision.

(2.) THE only question is, what is the date on which the award was filed In the counter-affidavit, it was stated that the award was filed in the office of the Collector on February 5, 1958. S. 11 (1) of the Act provides that " such award shall be filed in the Peishkar's office and shall except as hereinafter provided be final and conclusive evidence as between the Peishkar and the person interested" THE learned counsel for the petitioner has contended, that the word 'file' occurring in this Section, has a formal or technical meaning, that is, the Collector must make an express order, that the award be filed and has to initial it. THEre is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed under it to indicate this. THE Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word 'file' as "to place papers on file or among public records", and the meaning given in Black's Law Dictionary is more apt and "is to endorse upon the paper the date of its reception, and retain it in office, subject to inspection by whomsover it may concern". In a note at the foot of this, it is further stated, that the word "in this country and at this day means, agreeably to our practice, depositing them in due order in the proper office". Jagadisa Aiyer on Manual of Law Terms and Phrases gives the meaning of the words 'to file' as "to deposit at an office or in court".

(3.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner also contended for the larger proposition, that the starting point of limitation is not the date of the filing of the award, but is the date on which information of the award reached the applicant for reference, and relied on the cases decided by the Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts, referred to above. It is sufficient to observe, that on the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court, I cannot accept this contention. This petition is therefore dismissed, but without costs.