(1.) The appellant is an Upper Division Clerk in the Public Works Department, whose Original Petition (No. 726 of 1959) for quashing Exts. P3 and P4 circular orders of the Government of Travancore-Cochin has been dismissed by the learned Judge before whom it came up for admission. The matter relates to fixation of the rank of the petitioner in the integrated gradation list of the ministerial staff of the Public Works Department. It appears that the rule in Travancore before the integration of the Travancore and Cochin States on 1-7-1949 was that junior clerks, who were promoted to higher grade by virtue of their test qualifications, will retain seniority over their former seniors who subsequently pass the tests and secure promotion. On 7-5-1951 the Government of Travancore-Cochin modified this rule to the effect that, if the senior got the test before the vacancy became permanent, he will be allowed to supersede the junior who got an officiating promotion earlier by virtue of his earlier test qualification. By Ext. P1 order dated 21-10-1955 the Government directed that the junior clerks who got promotion before 1-7-1949 to the higher grade by virtue of their test qualification superseding their seniors in the lower grade would be allowed to retain their rank in the integrated gradation list. On 24-9-1956 the Government issued Ext. P3 order clarifying the matter further by stating that the rule for retention of seniority in the higher grade enunciated in Ext. P1 would apply only to cases of permanent vacancies that arose before 1-7-1949, but not to vacancies that became permanent subsequent to that date, to which latter vacancies the rule laid down in the order of 7 -5-1951 will alone apply. Ext. P4 order of 25-10-1957 is only an affirmation of Ext. P3 order. The contentious of the appellant, in the Original Petition which gave rise to this appeal, were that the orders in Exts. P3 and P4, not having been passed with notice to him, are not binding on him, that there is no provision of law enabling the Government to reconsider its prior orders and that the impugned orders violate the guarantee given to the appellant under the Covenant and are therefore illegal. The learned Judge before whom the Original Petition came up for admission held:-
(2.) Orders of the nature of Exts. P1, P3 and P4 are only executive orders not amounting to law, passed in the exercise of the executive, functions of the State. An executive order may be changed at the will of the Government by another executive order. (See Krishna Das v. The State of Travancore-Cochin, ILR 1955 T. C. 404) and Muhammed v. The State of Kerala ( 1957 KLT 608 (F. B.)). In this case Exts. P3 and P4 do not even effect any material change in the order contained in Ext. P1; they are only clarifications of the prior order by which the Government intimated that the rule In Ext. P1 order was to apply only to cases of permanent vacancies that arose before the integration of Travancore and Cochin. The Government has the authority to make such clarifications. Even if Ext. P3 order is construed as a modification of the prior order contained in Ext. P1, we are of opinion that the Government is perfectly competent to do so. It is not shown how such a clarification or modification can be effected only with notice to the officers who may be affected by the same. In laying down a policy governing the integration of services consequent on the reorganisation of States it is not possible or necessary to give notice to the officers of the two integrating States who may be affected by such policy. The petitioner cannot urge any claim under the Covenant of integration entered into by the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin. Referring to the Covenant between the East Punjab States to form Patiala Union, the Supreme Court has observed in D. D. Cement Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner ( AIR 1958 SC 816 ) thus:
(3.) Further, all that is provided in Art.19(1) of the Covenant, which Article alone has any relevancy in this case, is: