CHERIYA NARAYANAN NAMBOODIRI Vs. MADHAVI AMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In a suit instituted in 1943 and disposed of in June, 1944, the petitioner herein obtained a decree for redemption of a kanom and for possession of the land covered thereby on the ground that he required it for his own cultivation, a ground which, since the transaction was a kanom, fell within clause (5) of S.20 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, as it originally stood. The 1st defendant in that suit was the kanomdar while the remaining defendants were tenants under him. In January 1957, the 2nd defendant in the suit, who is the respondent herein, came forward with an application for restoration of her holding relying upon S.52 of the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, XXXIII of 1951 and S.5(2) of the Malabar Tenancy (Amendment) Act XXII of 1956. The petitioner thereupon came forward with an application for the reception of further evidence and, that application having been dismissed by the court below, he has come up in revision.

(2.) The respondent's application really falls under S.5(2) of Act XXII of 1956 which has the effect of superseding S.52 of Act XXXIII of 1951, and the relevant portion of that section runs as follows:

(3.) It seems to have been argued in the court below that, on the law as it now stands, the petitioner's suit could not have been maintained in view of the third proviso to S.25 of the present Act by which a suit for recovery for bona fide need can be instituted only within certain stated periods, the petitioner's suit apparently not having been brought within any of those periods. This is an argument really foreign to the question that fell for consideration which was merely whether the petitioner's application for adducing further evidence should or hould not be allowed. But, I might observe that it is quite clear from the wording of the proviso, clause (a) thereof providing that in cases where the lease has expired before the commencement of Act XXXIII of 1951 the suit should be brought within certain stated periods after the commencement of the Act and clause (b) providing for cases where the lease has expired after the commencement of that Act, that the proviso can apply only to suits instituted after the commencement of that Act and not to suits like the present instituted before that Act.