KUNHIBI Vs. LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is the writ petitioner, whose prayer for vacating the refusal by the Land Acquisition Officer to refer under S.18 of the Land Acquisition Act, has been disallowed by a learned Judge of this Court. The appellant and her sister owned T. S. No. 92/6, Block 4, Ward 10, within the Calicut Municipality which had been acquired and the sister is alleged to have relinquished her share of the compensation in appellant's favour. The award had assessed the compensation at Rs. 77-1-6 on November 10, 1956, the notice under S.12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, hereafter referred to as the Act, appears to have been served on the appellant on November 23, 1956, and the application to refer under S.18 of the Act, is stated to have been received on January 5, 1957. The learned Judge has held these dates to be correct, the appellant not entitled to deduct the period spent for getting the certified copy of the award, and the application to refer to be barred by limitation. The appellant has also taken the position that the notice was not served on her personally on November 23, 1956, and she got it from another on November 24, 1956.

(2.) The argument that the appellant is entitled to deduct from the period of limitation the time spent for getting the certified copy of the award, has not been accepted by the learned Judge; and we agree with his conclusion about the appellant not being entitled to any such benefit. It is not disputed that the application for the reference to the Court should be within six weeks of the receipt of the notice, or within six months of the award, whichever expires earlier; and because of S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, certain Sections of the Limitation Act would be applicable including S.3. It follows that because of S.3 of the Limitation Act, the authority asked to refer is bound to dismiss the application, should it be beyond the Limitation mentioned in the Schedule; and, under S.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the special periods under special Acts have been made part of the Schedule. The appellant claims that in computing the period of six weeks, the time spent for getting the certified copy of the award should be excluded, for S.12 of the Limitation Act has also been applied to period fixed for limitation under special Acts. But we find that the appellant cannot be given the benefit of any of the several sub-sections. S.12(4) is the only provision that may be urged to be relevant, and in Burjorjee v. Special Collector, Rangoon (AIR 1926 Rangoon 135), it has been held to cover an application for reference under the Act. That view has not been, followed by other High Courts, and it is now settled that the words "to set aside an award" cannot be interpreted so as to cover applications to refer awards to the court under the Act. The learned judge was, therefore, right, and we respectfully agree with him that the argument for excluding the time spent for obtaining certified copy of the award from the period allowed under the Act, cannot be allowed.

(3.) The appellant has also claimed that the notice reached her not on November 23, 1956, but on November 24, 1956, and the application would be within time, should this part of her case be true. Now it is not disputed that the decision to order the reference or to reject the application on the ground of limitation, must be of the Officer who has made the award; bat in this case that is not proved. We have scrutinised the counter as well as the personal Register on which the averments In the counter are based; for, the officer, who made the award, was not occupying the office when the counter to the writ was filed in this court. The relevant part of the counter reads thus:--