(1.) The sale which the petitioner herein sought to set aside by his application brought under S.22 (1) of Kerala Act 31 of 1958 was a sale in execution of a decree for the recovery of arrears of michavaram. Now, it is well settled that michavaram is rent See Brahmadathan Namboodiripad v. Devassy ( 1958 KLT 654 F. B.); and therefore, by reason of the exclusion in sub clause (ix) of clause (c) of S.2 of the Act, arrears of michavaram, although a debt in the ordinary sense of the term, is not a debt within the meaning of the definition in that clause. Under S.22 (1), an application will lie only if the decree resulting in the sale was for the recovery of a debt and if the word, debt is used in the section in the sense in which it is defined in clause (c) of S.2, there can be no doubt that the petitioners application did not lie. S.2 says that in the Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the words defined by the section shall have the meaning given to them therein, and the question therefore resolves: itself into whether there is any reason for thinking that the context of S.22 (1) requires that the word, debt therein should be construed as meaning what I might call true debt and not debt as defined in S.2 (c), or, what I might call Act debt. I see nothing in the context that requires this. The general policy of the Act is to save the debts enumerated in sub clauses (i) to (xi) of clause (c) of S.2, what I might call the exxcluded debts, from the favours it confers on indebted agriculturists, and I can see nothing in the wording of S.22 (1) or in its object indicative of any special policy. The introduction of the words or to a banking company after the word creditor in the clause, for the recovery of a debt due to a creditor or to a banking company appearing in the section is no indication that the word debt is used therein to mean true debt and not Act debt. That certain debts due to a banking company come within the exclusion in S.2 (c) (xi) does not mean that the reference in S.22 (1) to a debt due to a banking company has the effect of bringing all excluded debts within its scope. For, whether the word, debt means true debt or Act debt, a debt due to a banking company as to any other company or person would be covered by the word debt, and the words due to a creditor or to a banking company, - - in liquidation would be mere surplusage if they were intended to qualify the nature of the debt, unless the intention was that the word debt should be construed as meaning Act debt in relation to the word creditor but true debt in relation to the word banking company. That seems to me a mode of construction which even the draftsmanship of this Act cannot excuse. Strictly speaking the words due to a creditor or to a banking - - - in liquidation appear to be unnecessary, but the reason for their presence seems to be that it was thought that some indication should be given as to how property could be sold under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the recovery of a debt. That, in the case of an Act debt (it will be noticed that any sum payable to the government or to any local authority is an excluded debt) can happen only in the case of money due to a banking company in liquidation; and, hence the special mention of a debt due to a banking company in liquidation as distinguished from a debt due to an ordinary creditor for the purpose of explaining why a sale under the Revenue Recovery Act was also brought within the scope of the section.
(2.) In my view the court below was quite right in dismissing the petitioners application on the ground that S.22 (1) of the Act did not apply to the sale in question.
(3.) I dismiss the Petition with costs.