(1.) Accused 1 and 2 in C. C. No. 107/58 on the file of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kottayam, are the revision petitioners. They were convicted of the offences under S.448, 354 and 323 read with S.34 I. P. C., and sentenced each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months. The charge was that on 18-6-1958 they trespassed into the house occupied by P. W.1, an unmarried girl and outraged her modesty and caused hurt to her brother, P. W. 4 who came to her rescue. P. W. 1 says that on that day her mother was not in the house, that her elder brother P. W. 4 and 2 other minor children were alone in the house, that at about 9-30 p. m., after they had gone to bed, P. W. 4 heard some foot steps in the verandah and lit the lamp when he found the 2nd accused on the southern verandah of the house. P. W. 4 asked him to go away, but he refused. P. W. 1 hearing the talk got up. Then the 1st accused caught hold of her hand and she cried. P. W. 4 went to her help when the 1st accused beat him and the 2nd accused fisted both P. Ws. 1 and 4. They also squeezed the breasts of P. W. 1. She says that she then escaped from their clutches and went to a neighbouring house, where P. Ws. 2 and 7 were living. The second accused then threatened P. W. 2 with a dagger and asked her to send away P. W. 1. P. W. 2 thereupon pushed her out of the house, lest there might be trouble for them. The 1st accused then dragged her to the road. P. W. 4 tried to intercede when the second accused fisted him and he ran away along with his younger brother and sister. Then it is stated the two accused dragged her by force along the public road for about a mile and took her to a chapel. The 1st accused jumped over the wall and wanted the second accused to lift P. W. 1 over the wall. At that time somebody shouted and then the second accused released his hold of P. W. 1. P. W. 1 then ran away and hid herself in a nearby tapioca plantation. She remained there for some time and then went to the house of the landlord. P. W. 4 was then in that house. Next day they went and told their mother what had happened. On 22-6-1958 P. W. 1 filed the first information report, Ext. P. 1 before the Sub-Inspector of Police, P. W. 10. After completing investigation the accused were charge sheeted.
(2.) During the course of the trial P. Ws. 2 and 7 denied the incident of P. Ws. 1 and 4 coming to their house that night followed by the two accused. P. W. 3 another neighbour who was examined to prove that he had seen P. W. 1 being dragged along the road by the two accused, also denied having witnessed such an incident. Likewise P. W. 5 another neighbour denied having seen the accused belabouring P. Ws. 1 and 4. There is no reason why if the incident is true, the witnesses should not support the prosecution case. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not prepared to believe the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 4 alone with regard to the second and third phase of the incident. But relying on their evidence alone with regard to the first part of the incident which happened inside the house, both the accused were convicted under S.448, 354 and 323 I. P. C. In appeal before the Sessions Judge of Kottayam the conviction and sentence were confirmed and the two accused have come up in revision.
(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the learned Sessions Judge having disbelieved the major portion of the evidence spoken to by P. Ws. 1 and 4 with regard to the second and 3rd part of the incident ought not to have accepted their evidence with regard to the incident that is alleged to have happened earlier in their house, in the absence of corroborating evidence. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly laid down the maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such a case the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not a mandatory rule of evidence. So it is not the rule that if a part of a witness's evidence is found to be not true or of a doubtful nature then his entire testimony has to be thrown over board. Yet if a witness's statement has a very considerable admixture of falsehood then it may not be possible for a court to pick out the grain of truth from the mass of chaff and as observed in Asmatulla v. Emperor (AIR 1933 All. 896):