OFFICIAL RECEIVER Vs. N SUBRAMONIA IYER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is directed against the order rejecting an application made by the appellant, under the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief act, 1958 or the Act, as it may be referred to, for discharging the liability under a decree in instalments. There was a usufructuary mortgage to the first respondent and lease back of the properties covered by it. On default in the payment of rent by the lessee who was also the mortgagor, a decree was obtained against him by the first respondent, for the recovery of possession of the properties with arrears of rent. Pursuant to it, the properties were delivered to the first respondent in or about the year 1104 M. E. Meanwhile, the mortgagor was adjudicated as insolvent and his estate vested in the appellant, who is the official receiver. The liability under the decree sought to be discharged under the Act, pertains to rent which had been in default before the decree and which had accrued till the date of the delivery of possession of the properties to the first respondent.

(2.) THE only question to determine is, whether the liability sought to be discharged is a "debt" within the purview of the Act. According to the first respondent, it is not, as it relates to "rent payable in respect of any land or building" which is excluded under S. 2 (c) (ix) of the Act from the definition of 'debt', but according to the appellant, the liability is not so excluded; incidentally, the learned counsel for the appellant also suggested, that S. 2 (c ) (ix)relates only to rent for use and occupation of any land or building. In our opinion, the appellant's contention is without substance and must be rejected. THE language of S. 2 (c) (ix) is specific, and applies to the liability in question, and there is no warrant for imposing any restriction upon it or introducing any limitation into it. THE learned counsel could rely only on subramonia Iyer v. Official Receiver, 1959 KLT. 269, a decision which was rendered on the terms and provisions of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings act, 1957, or the 1957 Act, as it may be referred to. At an earlier stage of the execution when the first respondent sought to execute the decree, the appellant applied for stay of proceedings, by virtue of S. 4 of the 1957 Act; in disposing of that matter in appeal, this Court observed in the case cited, that whatever be the meaning of the term "holding" under the Travancore-Cochin holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act, 1950. "in view of the opening words of the later Act [the 1957 Act] and its preamble, we cannot for a moment hold that the legislature intended to apply the provisions of the Act to a transaction of the nature before us now, namely, where the decree holder in the course of his money-lending business lent money to business people who executed an usufructuary mortgage in favour of the lender and the latter gives the property back on lease to the mortgagors. &quot ; THE proceedings in execution were therefore not stayed. We fail to see, how this decision can affect the interpretation or control the meaning, of S. 2 (c) (ix) of the Act. It is no authority for holding, that the decree obtained by the first respondent does not relate to rent payable in respect of a land or building. THE 1957 Act, as indicated by its preamble, purports to be but an interim legislative measure, "pending enactment of a comprehensive legislation relating to tenancy and agrarian reforms", whereas the Act is intended "to give relief to indebted agriculturists in the State of Kerala . " THE two Acts are not in pari materia, and in any event, we are not convinced that the applicability or otherwise of S. 4 of the 1957 Act, has anything to do with the interpretation of a plain statutory provision in the Act, which, in the fulfilment of its object to give relief to indebted agriculturists, seeks to explain indebtedness by defining what is and what is not a "debt". We are of the opinion, that the provision in S. 2 (c) (ix) must be interpreted, without reference to any meaning which this Court may have given to a wholly different provision enacted for a wholly different purpose. THE suggestion of the learned counsel that the operation of S. 2 (c) (ix) is restricted to rent for use & occupation of land or building, whatever this means, is without any basis. We have also noticed, that in the application for discharging the debt under the provisions of the Act, the appellant himself has treated the liability in question, as for rent payable under a lease.