RAGHAVA MENON Vs. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition under Art.226 by a police-constable to quash the order by which he was dismissed from service. After an enquiry into a charge of misbehaviour against him by the Circle Inspector of Police, an order of dismissal from service, was first passed by the District Superintendent of Police. The petitioner thereupon petitioned to the Government on January 30, 1958, contending, that the District Superintendent of Police was not competent to punish him. Afterwards, the Inspector General of Police quashed the order of dismissal passed by the District Superintendent of Police, and basing himself on the enquiry report, and after complying with the further formalities including the issue of a show-cause notice, he passed the final order, now impugned, dismissing the petitioner from service. As seen from the counter affidavit, the petitioner was served a memo on October 24,1958, upon the petition referred to above which he had made to the Government, intimating him, that the irregularity in the District Superintendent of Police dismissing him from service, had been set right by quashing that order, and that if the petitioner is aggrieved by the final order of dismissal passed by the Inspector General of Police, it is open to him to appeal against the Inspector Generals order, if he is so advised. The petitioner, without preferring an appeal, has filed this petition.

(2.) Although on the merits, the petitioner has an arguable point that the Circle Inspector of Police, who conducted the enquiry against him, had no authority to do so, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Government Pleader, that by reason of the petitioners not having exhausted his alternative remedy, he should not be granted any relief under Art.226, must prevail. For this objection to apply, it does not matter, that the remedy by way of appeal became barred subsequently by lapse of time. It is true, that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an insuperable bar to the exercise of the powers under Art.226 of the Constitution. As held by the Supreme Court in U.P. State v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 S.C. 86, ordinarily there will be no interference under Art.226, where the aggrieved party does not avail himself of the alternative remedy granted by law. T.K. Joseph, J., has applied this rule in New Kerala Bus Transport, Cannanore v. Regional Transport Authority, 1959 KLT 405 and I have myself applied the rule in M/s. C. George Peter v. Its Workmen, 1959 KLJ 1416. In the present case I do not find anything, to take it out of the scope of the ordinary rule. The preliminary objection is therefore accepted. This petition fails and is dismissed, but without costs.