ABRAHAM Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal seeks to vary the order by a learned Judge of this Court, whereby the appellant's petition for certiorari prohibition, and madamus, has been dismissed on the ground of his not having earlier invoked the jurisdiction under Article 226. To satisfactorily adjudicate on the arguments urged in support of the appeal, which have been spread over a number of days, certain facts should be stated.

(2.) THE Director of the State Transport, under Section 68 (C) of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, had published a draft scheme for introducing regular stage carriage services on two routes, which are : (1) Punalur-Pathauamthitta, and (2) Chengannur-Pathanamthitta. THE scheme was published in the Gazette of April 15, 1958 , and the appellant as well as others filed objections, because the scheme adversely affected them. It is not disputed that the objections were heard by the Secretary to Government, public Works Department, on July 22, 1958 ; and the order was passed by the Minister for Transport on August 9, 1958 , who, overruling the appellant's objections, approved the scheme, which was thereafter notified in the Gazette of August 12, 1958. THE Director of State Transport commenced two Express services from September 9, 1958 , and these services were continued till March 16, 1959. THEreafter, the Director introduced two ordinary bus services on the same routes, and the appellant's case is that the change has brought about unhealthy competition with his buses, which are run on one of the two routes, with the result that he is daily losing more than Rs. 50/ -. This complaint of having introduced rates for the Government buses much below those permitted to the appellant, forms the subject matter of the writ petition, that was filed in this court on June 5, 1959.

(3.) IT cannot be disputed that the appellant's objection to the scheme was only to the Government passenger service being at some time introduced on the routes; otherwise he would not be interested in raising any objection. What the appellant had to urge in support, was evidently heard by the Government Secretary, and an adjudication on the argument, would settle the controversy. IT follows that a reasonable man would soon after take steps to vacate the adjudication, and would not wait till consequential order is issued. To put it differently, quasi judicial approach is required in determining the objection, and whatever complaint be against the procedure followed in deciding, it should be made soon after the decision be given. IT follows that the appellant's complaint against the hearing of his objection being not according to principles of natural justice, would be long delayed, as the decision on the objection was on August 9, 1958 , and he filed the writ petition on June 5, 1959. We, therefore, hold that the appellant, by filing the objections and pressing them to hearing, knew full well what would be the reasonable consequences of its being rejected, and he ought to have filed his writ petition soon after the decision was given. The running of the passenger services, in our opinion, would but be the consequence of what had been approved earlier; and its introduction in March 1959, would not justify the appellant being treated as diligent. Therefore, we think the claim of the order having been passed in breach of principles of natural justice, would be delayed, and the delay precludes the appellant's getting the discretionary relief. Nor do we see how the controverted fact of any undertaking having been given at the hearing of the objections, saves the claim to the relief. The counter affidavit denies any such undertaking having been given, which thus raises an issue of fact in the proceedings under Article 226 ; and, we have already mentioned that such questions cannot be adjudicated in such proceedings. IT follows that the ground of an undertaking having been given, also fails in establishing the appellant's diligence.