AMMED Vs. KRISHNAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is to bring up the records in a land acquisition case, and. for quashing the award therein,as having been passed in violation of the provisions of law. The Government of Madras initiated proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which may be referred to hereafter as the 'Act', upon the recommendation made by the Department of Education, which was moved to do so by the first respondent, the manager of a private school. After the Notification prescribed by S.4(1) of the Act was published, the notice of enquiry under S.5-A was issued on March 4, 1956, calling for objections to be filed within fifteen days of the receipt thereof, or thirty days of the publication of the Notification aforesaid, and fixing April 2, 1956, as the date for enquiry. According to the second respondent, who is the Sub-Collector and who may be deemed to be the Collector for the purpose of the Act, the enquiry was held in part on the date fixed and was adjourned to April 28, 1956, on a fresh notice which was issued. No one was present on that date; after more than one adjournment, it could take place only on October 29, 1956, when the second respondent also made a local inspection. On December 10, 1956, he sent his report, and forwarded the records of the case to the Government of the State of Kerala which had then been formed. In paragraph 7 of their affidavit filed on December 13, 1959, the petitioners have admitted that:

(2.) Having set out these facts, it may be useful, at this stage, to advert to the relevant provisions in the Act and in the Rules framed under it, which were said to have been contravened by the second respondent in conducting the

(3.) The question is, how far this violation of Rule 3(b) vitiates the proceedings under S.5-A of the Act and has been answered by a Division Bench of this Court in Lonappan v. Sub-Collector, Palghat, 1959 KLJ 457, by holding, that it renders "the final order and declaration made by the Government for the acquisition of the land........... without jurisdiction and illegal and liable to be quashed," reversing on appeal, the judgment of the Madras High Court by Balakrishna Iyer J., who apparently had held, that Rule 3(b) in this respect was only directory. The decision of the Division Bench is binding on me, and has to be followed; but the learned Government Pleader has contended, that the Bench has really held that the Rule is directory and not mandatory, and in the present case, the petitioners were not prejudiced by the infraction of the Rule, that the petitioners had waived the objection as to the want of notice to the requiring department, and that Rule 3(b) is ultra vires of the Act, having without warrant, extended the scope of S.5-A. In my opinion, these contentions are of no force and cannot prevail.