DAMODARAN NAIR Vs. TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is to quash a demand, evidenced by Ext. P. 1, made by the third respondent, the Tahsildar, Thodupuzha, under S.24 of the Travancore-Cochin Revenue Recovery Act, 1951, which may be referred to briefly as the Revenue Recovery Act. The demand was for the sum of Rs. 3,546. 11, which, it was stated, represented arrears of rent, which had accrued due to the first J respondent, which is the Travancore Devaswom Board, in respect of a leasehold in the possession of the petitioner. S.45 of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, which may be referred to briefly as Act XV of 1950, has provided, that in the cases specified therein, "the rents and other dues of any Hindu Religious Endowment may be collected as arrears of public revenue under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being in force". It may be taken, that the demand covers in part, arrears of rent which had accrued prior to the commencement of the Kerala Slay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance, 1957, and which, it was contended for the petitioner, is not legally recoverable, by reason of S.4 of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1957, which may be referred to briefly as Act I of 1957, the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act being of no avail, notwithstanding S.45 of Act XV of 1950. In other words, the contention was, that a landlord being precluded by S.4 of the Act I of 1957 from instituting a suit or other proceeding for the recovery of rent accrued due to him before the commencement of the aforesaid Ordinance, or from continuing any pending suit or other proceeding, in a Court, such rent had ceased to be legally recoverable. It seems to me, on a reading of ' S.45 of Act XV of 1950 and S.4 of Act I of 1957, that this contention is palpably unsustainable. It may be, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that S.45 of Act XV of 1950 has prescribed only a procedure for the realisation of arrears of rent, but then, it is a procedure, additional or alternative to, the ordinary procedure under the Civil Procedure Code for such realisation, by obtaining a decree and executing it. S.4 of Act I of 1957 does not purport to touch substantive rights of parties, and creates a bar, only to the institution of suits or proceedings and to their prosecution in a Court and nowhere else. It was not contended, that a Tahsildar functioning under the Revenue Recovery Act, is a Court within the meaning of S.4 of Act I of 1957. This provision, far from depriving the landlord of his right to such arrears, leaves untouched his right to realise the same in any other mode sanctioned by law. If there is such a mode, which is not hit by the bar under S.4 of Act I of 1957, as through the machinery provided by the Revenue Recovery Act, the arrears do not cease to be legally recoverable.

(2.) The learned counsel invited my attention to the decision of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in P. C. Vareed v. Gopalbai Bahubai Patel Rambai Gopalbai Patel, ( 1954 KLT 188 ) in support of the position, that immunity from civil process is a vested right. That case has nothing to do with the present, In that case, under the Cochin Civil Procedure Code, the Coimbatore Court was a foreign Court, whose judgment was not conclusive and could not be executed in the former Cochin State, until by the Amendment Act (Central Act II of 1951) the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, came into force in that area on April 1, 1951. The question arose, whether by reason of S.20 of the Amendment Act, the right of the judgment debtor in a decree passed by the Coimbatore Court to object to its execution in the Cochin Court, which was available to him under the Cochin Civil Procedure Code, was saved ; the full bench held in the case cited, that such a right was a vested right, and was saved. On account of this immunity from execution, the learned counsel for the petitioner here contended, that no right itself subsisted under the decree. This was so, for the reason, that the judgment of the Coimbatore Court was a nullity under the provisions of the Cochin Civil Procedure Code. I am not confronted with such a situation, and no such situation can be envisaged under S.4 of Act I of 1957, the immunity under which to the tenant, is only partial and temporary, from proceedings in a Court, either pending or prospective, for the realisation of accrued rent. This did not deprive the landlord of his right to the amount, or his right to recover it in other ways sanctioned by law. It may also be noted, that in respect of pending proceedings, the operation of S.4 of Act I of 1957 is only to impose a stay for a period of time ; this too, is not without significance.

(3.) The learned counsel mentioned by way of analogy, that rent may cease to be legally recoverable under the law of limitation and that it is inconceivable, that such rent could be recovered through coercive process under the Revenue Recovery Act. In my view, there is really no analogy, for, by the operation of the law of limitation such rent is not legally recoverable. The question of limitation does not directly arise in this case, as it was not contended for the petitioner, that any part of the claim covered by Ext. P. 1 is barred by limitation. If he has any such objection, it is only necessary to raise it under S.24(3) of the Revenue Recovery Act. For the foregoing reasons, I am unhesitatingly of the view, that the remedy under the Revenue Recovery Act for the realisation of arrears of rent is not lost by anything in Act I of 1957.