KESAVAN Vs. SIRKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The 2nd accused is the Revision Petitioner. He was a merchant allowed to sell ration food grains. On the allegation that his servant the 1st accused sold five bags of rice in the black market on 27.2.1124, both the accused were charge sheeted before the lower court under Act I of 1122 for contravening the Food grains Rationing Order of 1119. The charge was filed in court on 14.8.1124 and no witness had been examined by the prosecution till now. The period for which Act I of 1122 was to be in force expired on 30.9.1949 i.e. 14.2.1125. On 15.12.1949 the petitioner made a motion before the lower court for dropping the proceedings in the case as the case started under Act I of 1122 was not provided to be continued in the subsequent Ordinance No. V of 1125. The lower court was of opinion that by virtue of the saving clause in S. 36 of the Ordinance, it was competent to continue the proceedings. The petition was therefore dismissed by the order sought to be revised.

(2.) Act I of 1122 was to be in force only for a period of 2 years or for which further periods or period as might be notified by the government in the Gazette from time to time. The period had been extended by one year by two notifications and the Act ceased to be in force from 1.10.1949. This was followed by the Public Safety Measures Ordinance No. V of 1125 which came into operation from 1.10.1949. The saving clause in this Ordinance referred to by the learned Magistrate is in S. 36 which runs as follows:-

(3.) It is settled law that as a general rule, unless there is a special rule to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have further effect. Consequently an offence committed against a temporary Act must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires and as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which had been taken against a person will ipso facto terminate. This aspect came up for consideration in three rulings of the Travancore High Court. Sirkar v. Ramalingom Panicker (1947 TLR 706), 22 TLT 25 and Mydeen Picha v. Sirkar (1948 TLR 1039). The first two were cases decided by a Division Bench and the third by a Single Judge. Those were cases started under R.81(4) of the Defence of Travancore Rules. The question then was whether the proceedings in those cases could be continued after the Act I of 1122 came into force. In the latter Act also there was a provision for keeping in force certain orders passed under some of the rules of the Defence of Travancore Rules. S.37 of the Act I of 1122 makes that provision. In that there had been no powers granted for continuing any criminal case started under R.81(4). It had been unanimously held in those cases that the cases which were being prosecuted under R.81(4) of the Defence of Travancore Rules could not continued after those Rules became inoperative and unenforceable. If a Statute is enacted for a definite period then any steps taken under that Act would cease to be in force unless a special provision was made for the purpose in the succeeding Statute. That is not the case with statute repealed; for S.7 of the General Clauses Act in force then had made ample provision for continuing the proceedings even after the statute was repealed. That is not the case with an express statute which had been enacted for a definite purpose and for a definite period. Thus unless a definite provision had been made in the succeeding statute the proceedings started but not terminated could not be continued. Waston v. Winch (1916 (1) KB 688), Haripada Lal Ghosh v. Tofajaddi Ijardar (ILR 60 Cal. 1438), Bansgopal v. Emperor (AIR 1933 All. 669) and Rampalsingh v. Emperor (AIR 1948 Pat. 229) are also authorities for this position. S. 36 of the Ordinance V of 1125 quoted above does not make any provision for the continuance of the unterminated proceeding started under Act I of 1122 and as such the Magistrate was incompetent to proceed with the case. The order now passed is therefore clearly wrong. It is set aside and the Magistrate is directed to drop all proceedings in C.C. 102 of 1124 of his file in which the petitioner and another are being prosecuted. The petition is thus allowed.