(1.) Under challenge in this revision filed under Section 20 of Act 2 of 1965 is the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority ordering eviction on the ground under Sub-section (8) of Section 11. The landlord had invoked Sub-section (3) of Section 11 and Sub-section (8) of Section 11 for evicting the tenant. The Rent Control Court found that the Rent Control Petition is maintainable only on the ground of Sub-section (3) of Section 11. That Court, on appreciating the evidence, came to the conclusion that the need projected by the landlord was a bona fide one. Neverthless that Court concluded further that the tenant was successful in proving that he satisfies both the ingredients of the second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 11. Accordingly, notwithstanding the finding that the need is bona fide, the Rent Control Petition was dismissed. The Appellate Authority, considering the appeal preferred by the landlord, reversed the findings of the Rent Control Court and found that in the fact situation which obtains in the case it is Sub-section (8) of Section 11 that applies. After concluding so, the Appellate Authority would hold further that the standards for determining bona fides in a case of Section 11(8) are not so stringent as in the case of Sub-section (3) of Section 11 and also that the need for additional accommodation projected by the landlord is bona fide. The question whether the Rent Control Petition is liable to fail in view of the proviso to Sub-section (10) of Section 11 was also answered in favour of the landlord and it was held that the advantages which the landlord will gain by getting eviction will outweigh the hardship which may be occasioned to the tenant. In order to conclude so, the Appellate Authority relied on the evidence of RW1, the tenant himself.
(2.) The tenant in this revision has raised various grounds, including the ground that the Appellate Authority went wrong in taking the view that it is Sub-section (8) of Section 11 that applies and not Sub-section (3) of Section 11. Placing strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in Abraham Roy v. Philip @ Pappachan and Ors.,2009 2 KLT 29(C. No. 34) :, 2009 (2) KHC 462) to which one among us (P.C.K. (J.)) was party and also the statutory provision, it was argued strongly by Sri. Vipindas that in order Sub-section (8) of Section 11 applies, it is absolutely necessary that the landlord must be in actual physical occupation of a part of the building, another part of which is the tenanted building. Sri. Vipindas pointed out that going by the pleadings and also by the admissions in the evidence, the landlord is not in occupation of any part of the larger building. On the contrary, it is landlord's son who is in occupation of the other part and is conducting vessels business therein. Additional accommodation has been sought for accomplishing the personal use of not the landlord but the landlord's son. According to Sri. Vipindas the finding of the Appellate Authority that Section 11(8) applies is to be set-aside immediately.
(3.) Sri. Kaleeswaram Raj, learned Counsel for the landlord, would per contra draw our attention to the judgment of this Court in Pakran v. Kunhiraman Nambiar,2004 1 KLT 824and the judgment in Arjunan v. Eranu,1991 2 KLT 279and argue that it has been held that additional accommodation contemplated by Sub-section (8) of Section 11 need not necessarily be that of the landlord but can also be the need of a dependent family member of the landlord. Sri. Raj also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, 1979 AIR(SC) 272and argue that the concept of own occupation by the landlord is not to be construed in a narrow manner though the same is confined to own occupation by the landlord and nothing short of that.