(1.) This writ petition is filed challenging proceedings leading to Ext.P-18, an order issued by the Devaswom Commissioner.
(2.) Ext.P-14 notification was issued by the Devaswom Commissioner under Section 37(1) of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the "Act". That was a preliminary notification calling for objections to the tentative decision to pass an order of assumption of the Ambattukavu Bhagavathy Temple, Thaikkattukara, Aluva west Village. Objections were filed. Therefore, a decision as to whether the management of the institution has to be assumed or not had to be taken by the competent authority, namely, the Devaswom Commissioner. He, however, issued the impugned Ext.P-18 in purported exercise of powers under Sections 41 and 42(1) of the Act. In terms of Section 41, the Commissioner has proceeded to dissolve the committee functioning by virtue of Trust Deed No. 205/1993 and removed the committee in purported exercise of that power. The Administrative Officer of the Travavancore Devaswom Board in Aluva was appointed under Section 42(1) as the Administrative Officer. The Deputy Devaswom Commissioner was directed to constitute a new temple advisory committee in the temple. This is on the basis that there is a purported dissolution of the committee in office. The Administrative Officer, Aluva was directed to take charge of the temple within 15 days from the date of notification, i.e., Ext.P-18. The writ petition is filed challenging the decision contained in Ext.P-18 notification.
(3.) When proceedings are taken under Section 37 and an order of assumption passed on any grounds mentioned under Section 37(1), any person aggrieved by it has a right to suit before the competent District Court in terms of Section 37(4) of the Act. That is a statutory right. The right is to file a suit before a court. This means that the legislative provision is one for adjudication by the competent court. The exercise of that statutory power by the court would result in a judicial decision. Therefore, the right to sue under Section 37(4) is very valuable. Not only that, even in terms of that provision, the order of assumption will become final subject to the result of the suit. This means that in the normal course of proceedings and procedures, it is only through a suit under Section 37(4) could a decision for assumption under Section 37(1) be impeached. This right to have redressal through the judicial process cannot be nipped or crippled by the issuance of a notification, as if it were a composite one, under Sections 37, 41 and 42.