SURESH LAL Vs. JOHNY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Under challenge in this revision under Section 20 filed by the alleged sub tenant is the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority confirming the order of the Rent Control Court dismissing an interlocutory application filed by the petitioner. The prayer in the interlocutory application(I.A. No.10420/2004) was that, as the petitioner has denied the title of the landlord and has contended that as he is a person continuing in possession pursuant to an agreement for sale between him and the first respondent in the RCP(the tenant), the parties be relegated to the civil court. The Rent Control Court took the view that, as the alleged status of the revision petitioner is that of a sub tenant, he is not entitled to take up a plea of denial of title as envisaged by sub section (1) of Section 11.

(2.) Before the Rent Control Appellate Authority the ground which was prominently taken in the appeal, which was preferred by the petitioner, was one based on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Parthakumar v. Ajith Viswanathan (2006 (2) KLT 250 (FB). It was argued on the basis of the above judgment that in order that a plea of denial of landlord's title raised by the respondent in the Rent Control Petition is adjudicated by the Rent Control Court, it is not necessary that the person taking up the plea admits his status that of a tenant or the landlord alleges the status of that person to be that of his tenant. The Appellate Authority under the impugned judgment has taken the view that in the nature of the contention taken by the petitioner, which is to the effect that he is in possession on the basis of part performance of an agreement for sale, the Rent Control Court has no jurisdictional competence. According to the Appellate Authority, the jurisdiction of the Rent Control Court is only to decide the question whether the denial of landlord's title is bona fide or not. Taking that view of the matter, the learned Appellate Authority would approve the order of the Rent Control Court and dismiss the appeal.

(3.) We do not find any warrant for interference to the judgment of the Appellate Authority. As noticed by the Appellate Authority, when a plea of denial of landlord's title is taken up by somebody who is arrayed as a respondent in the eviction petition, the Rent Control Court has the jurisdiction to decide whether the above plea is bona fide. In Charulatha v. Manju (2004 (1) KLT 290) a Division Bench of this Court took the view that, in order that a person is permitted to take up a plea of denial of landlord's title under Sub Section (1) of Section 11, he should concede his status in the building to be that of a tenant whether under the petitioner in the RCP or some other landlord. The Full Bench of this Court in Parthakumar v.Ajith Viswanathan (cited supra) however, would overrule the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Charulatha v. Manju (cited supra). The Full Bench held that in order that a person, who is arrayed as a respondent in the RCP is allowed to take up a plea of denial of landlord's title or a claim of permanent tenancy as contemplated by Section 11(1), bona fides of which is to be adjudicated by the Rent Control Court, it is sufficient that the status of the person who takes up the plea is either admitted by the person or alleged by the petitioner/landlord to be that of a tenant. In the instant case, the landlord does not admit the status of the present petitioner to be that of his tenant. On the contrary, landlord's allegation is that the present petitioner is sub tenant under the first respondent in the RCP. The present petitioner also does not admit his status to be that of a tenant whether under the petitioner in the RCP or even under the first respondent admitted tenant. According to us, going by the judgment of the Full Bench in Parthakumar v. Ajith Viswanantan(cited supra), the petitioner is not entitled to raise a plea of denial of title as envisaged by second proviso to sub section (1) of Section 11. Hence we are of the view that there is no infirmity about the judgment of the Appellate Authority warranting corrections under the present revisional jurisdiction.