LAWS(KER)-2010-11-76

AUGUSTINE Vs. ALBERT

Decided On November 11, 2010
AUGUSTINE Appellant
V/S
ALBERT Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE tenant is the revision petitioner. He was sought to be evicted by the respondent landlord on the ground under sub section (3) of Section 11 of Act 2 of 1965. THE need projected by the landlord was that the petition schedule building is required bona fide for the purpose of storage of jaggery by the dependent son of the landlord who is already conducting trade in jaggery. Bona fides of the need was disputed by the tenant who also claimed protection of the second proviso to sub section (3) of Section 11. In the enquiry conducted by the rent control court, the evidence consisted of Exts.A1 to A5, Exts.B1 to B5, Ext.C1 commission report and the testimonies of witnesses PWs1 & 2 and DWs1 and 2. PW1 was the landlord himself and PW2 was the dependent son for whose purpose the building was sought. DW1 was the revision petitioner and DW2 was the commissioner who submitted Ext.C1 report. THE Rent Control Court was inspired by the oral evidence given by PWs1 and 2. In fact DW1 also would concede in his evidence that PW2 is conducting jaggery business in a large scale. His evidence in the context of the second proviso to sub section(3) of Section 11 was to the effect that other buildings are actually available in the locality. On appreciating the evidence, the rent control court concluded that the need is bona fide and that the tenant was unsuccessful in showing that he is entitled to the protection of the second proviso to sub section (3) of section 11.

(2.) THE revision petitioner preferred appeal against the order of the rent control court and the appellate authority considering that appeal, reappraised the entire evidence. THE appellate authority would concur with all the conclusions of the rent control court. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

(3.) HOWEVER, considering the last plea of Mr.Rajesh that at least one year's time be granted to the revision petitioner for surrendering the premises, we feel that in this case there is justification for granting 9 months time from today. Accordingly, we are inclined to grant so much of time subject to conditions.