(1.) Revision is directed against the order dated 26.5.2005 in TLB.SMC 3/86/Mtdy by the Taluk Land Board, Mananthavady. Petitioners are the wife and children of late Veerchandra Gowder, as against whom the Taluk Land Board accepting his statement that he did not possess any excess land closed the ceiling proceedings. However, later, suo motu proceedings were initiated, after his death, against the 1st petitioner, his widow, on detection that the declarant possessed excess land and that neither the declarant nor his legal heirs had filed returns as per the Land Reforms Act and Rules. The order passed by the Taluk Land Board fixing the excess land to be surrendered by the 1st petitioner/widow of late Veerchandra Gowder was challenged by her filing a revision as C.R.P.No.2530 of 2000. Accepting the contentions canvassed by the petitioner in that revision, the 1st petitioner herein, that notice of the proceedings had not been issued to the other legal heirs of late Gowder, the order of the Taluk Land Board was set aside and the case was remitted directing the Board to implead all legal representatives and pass appropriate orders after issuing notice and hearing them. Pursuant to such remission, after issuing notice to all legal heirs, petitioners, and hearing them, the Taluk Land Board has passed the present order challenged in the revision holding that the petitioners are liable to surrender 76.00.250 acres of land as excess land.
(2.) I heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and also the learned Government pleader. The learned counsel for the petitioners challenged the order of the Taluk Land Board contending that the proceedings initiated by the Board after termination of the previous proceedings accepting the statement of late Veerchandra Gowder was beyond time, and so much so, the Board was not competent to review or reopen its previous order. Relying on Section 85 (9A) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is contended that the Board cannot review or reopen its order after a period of three years. To substantiate that contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Mary Michael v. Taluk Land Board (2001 (2) KLT 603) rendered by a Single Judge of this Court. On the merits also, the order of the Taluk Land Board is challenged contending that the case of the petitioners that major portions of the land ordered to be surrendered are coffee and rubber plantations even before 1.4.1964, and thus, exempted lands from the provisions of the Ceiling Rules, but, it was not considered and appreciated by the Board. Request made by the claimants to call for the records relating to the registration of such land by the Coffee Board and Rubber Board were not heeded to by the Board, but, improperly reliance was placed on the report of the revenue authority to rule out the exemption claimed by the petitioners, according to the counsel. So much so, the order passed by the Taluk Land Board challenged in the revision is liable to be set aside, submits the counsel.
(3.) Perusing the impugned order with reference to the submissions made by the counsel, I find none of the challenges raised can be entertained to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The decision rendered by the learned counsel Mary Michael v. Taluk Land Board (2001 (2) KLT 603) has been overruled by a Full bench of this Court in Balan v. State of Kerala (2006 (4) KLT 229 (F.B.)) holding that for reopening a case, the Board need only issue a notice within the time limit of three years. Petitioners have no case that within the period of three years, notice was not issued for reopening of the case. The final order has not been passed within a period of three years cannot be canvassed as a ground to impeach the power of the Board to review the previous order or proceedings where there is reason to do so. Once a notice is issued, it has been held by this Court, it gets jurisdiction with the course of review. That being so, the challenge canvassed that the Taluk Land Board lacked jurisdiction to review the previous order accepting the statement of late Veerchandra Gowder that he had no excess land to be surrendered, is without any merit. So far as the denial of opportunity of the petitioners to establish their case that major portion of the land ordered to be surrendered as excess land is plantation even before 1.4.1964, and thus, exempted land, after perusing the impugned order passed by the Taluk Land Board, I find there is no merit at all. Petitioners did not produce any worthmentioning evidence to sustain their claim that major portion of the land was an exempted land as it was a plantation before the crucial date of 1.4.1964. What they produced was only photocopy, and that too in respect of licence issued for planting for one year after the crucial date of 1.4.1964. It was also found that verification of the licence number in the document produced by the petitioners revealed that that licence number related to another registered owner and it was not issued from Mananthavady office though it was shown as such. Petitioners have applied to the Board to call for documents from the Rubber Board and also the Coffee Board, but, it was not considered and the report of the revenue officer was relied on to discard their claim that the major portion of the land was exempted land as plantations is the other challenge canvassed to impeach the order of the Taluk Land Board. The Rubber Board has informed it has no practice of issuing registration certificate as shown in the certificate produced by the petitioners. If at all any portion of the land continue as a plantation before 1.4.1964, and thus, it was an exempted land from the ceiling provisions, petitioners could have produced documents before the Taluk Land Board. They have no case that even their predecessor late Veerchandra Gowder had produced any such document when he filed the statement, on which the previous proceedings were passed holding that he had no excess land to surrender. To claim exemption of the land which has been fixed as excess land on the ground that it is a plantation even before the crucial date 1.4.1964, the petitioners were bound to produce valid documents establishing their claim of exemption. The documents produced by them were found to be fake, with the certificate number endorsed showing it related to some other registered owner. In such circumstance, the claim of exemption canvassed by the petitioners that major portion of the land was a plantation was rightly and correctly repelled by the court.