NARAYANAN N M Vs. NADUVIL MADOM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Some of the Defendants in a suit for eviction are the Appellants. Concurrent decision rendered by the courts below holding that the first Respondent/Plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit property, a building with arrears of rent and also the sum fixed due, towards use and occupation of the building after termination of the tenancy, is challenged in the appeal.

(2.) Admittedly, the building is owned by the Plaintiff and it was let out under a tenancy arrangement, fixing a monthly rent of 15 per month by a registered deed in 1951, in favour of the predecessor of the Defendants. Subsequently the rent was enhanced to 40 per month. Plaintiff is a Hindu religious institution, governed by the provisions covered by Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act 15 of 1950, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'. The Cochin Devaswom Board constituted under the above Act, admittedly, has a supervisory regulatory control over the affairs of the institution in the creation of mortgages, charges, alienation etc. over its properties, as under Section 86 of the Act. The Defendant in the suit had resisted the eviction admitting the tenancy arrangement over the building on very many grounds. But in view of the concurrent decision of the two courts below granting decree of eviction in the present Second Appeal what survives for consideration is only the challenge mooted that the Plaintiffs were incompetent to seek for their eviction of the tenants from the building without the Cochin Devaswom Board also made a party in the suit for eviction. That plea was raised for the first time before the lower appellate court, and not by the pleadings of the case. The lower appellate court not impressed with the plea canvassed turned it down. Some of the Defendants in the suit have preferred this appeal raising the aforesaid challenge, to impeach the correctness of the decree of eviction.

(3.) I heard the counsel on both sides. The learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants contended that though the tenancy over the building with their predecessor commenced under the Plaintiffs, who are indisputably their landlords, in view of the interdiction placed under the Act, Cochin Devaswom Board alone is competent to sue for evicting them from the building. At any rate, the presence of Cochin Devaswom Board as a party to the proceedings, the suit for eviction, is essential, and since it has not been made a party, the suit is bad for nonjoinder of a necessary party and as such, the decree rendered by the courts below is unsustainable, according to the counsel. Reliance is placed on Section 86 of the Act to contend that the suit filed without Cochin Devaswom Board as a party or sanction from that Board for evicting the Defendants from the building, was not maintainable. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the first Respondent/ Plaintiff submitted that before the suit was laid, there was a proposal from the tenant to purchase the building and the Plaintiff was amenable and prepared to transfer the building by sale subject to sanction from Cochin Devaswom Board. However, when the Plaintiff applied for sanction of the Board, turning down the proposal, the Board directed the Plaintiff to initiate appropriate legal action to safeguard its interest over the building, a trust property. The proceedings passed by the Board, Ext. A-11 has been produced before the court, which according to the counsel, is more than sufficient to satisfy whatever requirements, if any, needed under the Act, to sue for eviction of the tenants from the building. Placing reliance on "P. M. Brahmadathan Namboodiripadu v. Cochin Devaswom Board,1955 KerLT 516, the learned Counsel further contended that the provisions under the Act, more particularly Sections 79 to 86, do not make any inroad into the rights of the religious institution by the statutory authority, Cochin Devaswom Board, but, only provide measures for regulating the functions of such institutions to the extent necessary for securing and safeguarding the properties of such institutions. The provisions referred to above are only regulatory in character, as stated in the above reported decision, is emphasised by the counsel to contend that the presence of the Cochin Devaswom Board in the suit or sanction from the Board, to sue for eviction of the tenant is not necessary. So much so, according to the counsel, the challenge now mooted, impeaching the maintainability of the suit, for the absence of Cochin Devaswom Board as a party, which was not even pleaded or raised before the trial court, is bereft of any value or merit.