AMINA MAJEED Vs. STATE OF KERALA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER, who was a Hindu by religion, married Majeed, who is a Muslim by religion. After marriage she embraced Islam. Her original name Rajalakshmy Amma was changed to Amina. The change of her religion and name were notified in the official gazette dated 13-9-1988 under Ext. P4. While so, the second respondent invited applications for the post of last grade servants in the Kerala Government Service in 1985. She applied for the post in her present name and she was invited for the test. As she fared well in the written test she was called for the interview. As per the interview conducted by the second respondent, the third respondent published rank list on 19-12-1989, The petitioner's complaint is that her name was not included in the list of OBC prepared by the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC ). When the petitioner enquired in the office of the third respondent, she was told that she is not entitled to get the benefits of a backward class candidate as she originally belonged to Hindu religion. Therefore, she has filed a petition before the second respondent to include her name in the quota reserved for Muslim community. She has also produced the certificates issued by the Tahsildar, Kottayam and the Thazhathangadi Muslim jamaath. So far there was no reply. So she has filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to include her name in the quota reserved for OBC (Muslim) for the post of last grade servants and to dispose of Ext. P8 representation within a specified period. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as she has become a Muslim she is entitled to get her name included in the list prepared by third respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner also invited my attention to the decision reported in Public Service commission v. Dr. Kunjamma Alex, 1981 Ker LT 24 : (1981 Lab IC 1511 ). In that case the Court held that by reason of a marriage, a change of community had taken place in regard to the petitioner and she had become a member of her husband's family, namely Latin Catholic (other than Anglo Indian) Community. The Court also held that the action taken by the PSC for deleting the writ petitioner's name from the select list prepare by it in respect of candidates found suit able for recruitment was illegal and unwarranted. But, the learned standing counsel for the PSC invited my attention to the decision reported in valsamma Paul v. Cochin University (1996 (1) KLT 169 ). It was a case where the court held that a candidate belonging to the forward community who is transplanted in backward caste by adoption, or marriage, or conversion does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation. In paragraph 32 the Apex Court held that the object of reservation is to remove these handicaps, disadvantages, sufferings and restrictions to which the members of the Dalits or Tribes or OBCs were subjected to and was sought to bring them in the mainstream of the nation's life by providing them opportunities and facilities. In paragraph 33 referring to the decision in Muralidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu (JT 1995 (3) SC 563) the Apex Court held that a candidate who had the advantageous start in life being born in forward caste and had a march of advantageous life but is transplanted in backward caste by adoption or marriage or conversion, does not become eligible to the benefit of reservation either under Article 15 (4) or 16 (4), as the case may be. Acquisition of the status of Scheduled Caste etc. by voluntary mobility into these categories would play fraud on the Constitution, and would frustrate the benign constitutional policy under Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) of the Constitution. There is nothing on record to show that the petitioner was born as a member of the backward community. In the light of the above findings of the Apex Court, the petitioner who was originally a Hindu by religion, not a backward class, embraced Muslim faith, cannot claim the benefit of reservation. Moreover, on the date of filing of this original petition, the petitioner was aged 42 years and now she has completed 51 years of age. The period of the list has also expired long long before. Therefore, there is no meaning in keeping this original petition pending. She is not entitled to get the benefit as claimed by her. In result, this original petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed. . .