DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Vs. S. BEDI CONSTRUCTION CO.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent filed an application under Sections 14 and 17 of Arbitration Act, 1940 seeking direction against the Arbitrator to file original award rendered on 11.5.1992. Notice was directed to he issued to the Arbitrator pursuant to which the Arbitrator filed the award and the proceedings. On filing of the same in Court, notice was directed to be issued to the parties to the arbitration proceedings, namely claimant/respondent and the appellant. Notice on behalf of the respondent was accepted by its counsel. Notice was, however, directed to be served on the appellant. On receipt of the same, the appellant preferred objections to the award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, (I.A. 103/93). It was prayed by the appellant that the award be set aside as the Arbitrator had committed legal misconduct and there was error apparent on the face of record. Learned Single Judge by the impugned order dated 22.3.1996 dismissed the objections and as a natural consequence thereof, proceeded to make award of the Arbitrator as Rule of Court and granted decree in terms of the award.

(2.) Appeal against the above order was preferred by the appellant under Sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Act No. X) read with Sec. 10 of Delhi High Court Act, 1966 (Act No. 26). Show cause notice was issued in appeal to the respondent. On 23.2.1998 learned counsel for the respondent raised an objection about maintainability of the appeal contending that by the impugned order, learned Single Judge had proceeded to make the award of the Arbitrator Rule of Court and passed decree in terms thereof. No appeal was maintainable from such decree except on the ground that it was in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award. It was pointed out that there were some decisions rendered by High Courts of Calcutta and Punjab and Haryana, but there was no pronouncement of this Court on this point. Considering such an objection, reference was made to a larger bench observing that the matter was of importance, which needs constitution of Full Bench for the purpose of deciding the case. Order passed on 23.2.1998 reads as under :

(3.) In none of the decisions cited at the Bar by learned counsel for the respondent, appeal had arisen out of an order passed setting aside or refusing to set aside award. Appeals in all the cases had been preferred under Sec. 17 of the Arbitration Act against orders pronouncing decree in terms of the award. The parties appealing had not chosen to file any objections to the award and no prayer had been made by them to set aside the award.