(1.) The petitioner was working as Constable in the CISF Unit, ONGC (DVP) Jorhat, Assam. While serving in the unit, it is stated that he was illegally and arbitrarily dismissed from the service. While dismissing the services of the petitioner, two articles of charge were levelled against the petitioner leading to filing of the present writ petition. The first charge was that the petitioner who belongs to Central Industrial Security Force Unit reported for duty on 23rd March, 1995 in an intoxicated condition which amounted to gross indiscipline and dereliction of duty. The second charge levelled against the petitioner reads as under:
(2.) A bare perusal of the charge shows that the second charge is obviously. unsustainable as raising a grievance by filing a petition in accordance with law cannot be considered to be a misdemeanour. Averring about superior officers that he was deprived of his duty by false allegations cannot amount to indiscipline as far as the second article of charge is concerned particularly when this was contained in a representation in accordance with law sent to his superiors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment reported as Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande & Others Vs. Uttam and Anr. (1999) 1 LRI 568 has decided the question whether a prima facie case existed for trial or exception 8 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code pertaining to offence of defamation. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with regard to the subjet matter of accusation. Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that "Under such circumstances, the fact that the accused persons had made a report to the superior officer of the complainant alleging that he had abused the treasury officer in a drunken state which is the gravamen of the present complaint and nothing more, would be covered by exception 8 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code 1860."
(3.) In view of this position of law the second charge thus cannot be sustained. Therefore, as far as the second article of charge is concerned the said article of charge against the petitioner is hereby set aside.