DHIRENDRA KRISHAN Vs. BHEL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The purpose of prior sanction is to discourage frivolous and vexatious prosecution of public servants. It is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty. One of the guiding principles for sanctioning authority would be the public interest and therefore, the protection available to the public servant cannot be said to be absolute. The sanctioning authority or the Government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanctions. Despite the fact that the evidence discloses a primafacie case, they can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, including administration expediency. However, the sanctioning authority cannot adequately discharge this obligation without knowledge of the facts of the case and without applying its mind to those factors.

(2.) In UP Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 1435, the Supreme Court made the following observations: "11. The obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe.. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150. Even so the extent of judicial scrutiny/judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known, more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities; they have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. (Lord Diplock in Secy. of State for Education and Science v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council, 1977 AC 1014 (p.1064). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is. so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the Court intervene."

(3.) In the instant case, the only thing which has been alleged is 'bias' of the sanctioning authority. It is alleged that at one stage, the third respondent Dr. R.K.D. Shah had himself recommended the purchase of the equipment in question and recorded on note dt. 25/28th August 1989 for the circulation to the Directors of BHEL. The relevant part of the note reads as under: