HARBANS SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. SMT. GURCHARAN KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This petition has been brought under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking quashment of the complaint pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate under S. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'). It has been pleaded by the petitioners that the said offence punishable under S. 4 of the Act cannot be taken cognizance of as the same is barred by limitation.

(2.) The facts of the case, in brief, are that Smt. Gurcharan Kaur, respondent has filed a complaint against the present petitioners and two other persons, namely, Jang Bahadur Singh and Sukhjit Bahadur Singh, making allegations that her marriage was performed with Gursharan Singh on July 12, 1981, at Delhi and at the time of the settlement of the marriage, the petitioners had demanded dowry items comprising of T.V., fridge and scooter or Rs. 20,000/ - in lieu thereof besides other items of dowry which are given at the time of marriage normally. It was mentioned that the complainant's father had expressed his inability to meet the demands regarding T.V., fridge and scooter or Rs. 20,000/ - in lieu of the same but he agreed to meet the said demands by the by after the marriage and the petitioners are stated to have agreed to the performance of marriage under such conditions with great reluctance. It was further alleged that after 3 -4 months of the marriage, the petitioners again raised the demand for supply of the said dowry items or Rs. 20,000/ - in lieu thereof as consideration for the marriage and the complainant managed to obtain Rs. 1,000/ - on two occasions but the same did not satisfy the greed of the petitioners. It was alleged that the demand of said dowry items was again repeated from time to time and ultimately on July 2, 1983, the complainant was turned out from the matrimonial house on failure of her parents to meet the said demand of dowry. After obtaining necessary sanction from the authorities concerned, the complaint was filed.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that any demand of dowry made after the performance of the marriage cannot be termed as offence under S. 4 of the Act as is stood before amendment of the Act. He has further argued that demand of dowry made before the marriage as consideration for the marriage constituted the offence which had become time barred by the time the complaint was filed.