SHEEL UTPAL Vs. HARI CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Tenant Brij Mohan died on April 7, 1972? leaving behind the respondents, namely? his widow Sheel Utpal, and four sons, who succeeded to the tenancy rights. An eviction petition was filed on April 4, 1974, against them by their landlord Hari Chand under clauses (e) and (h) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter the Act). It was alleged that the tenancy commenced on the 1st day of each calendar month and was terminated by a notice dated March 13, 1974. Brij Mohan was allotted after commencement of the Act a residential flat in Janakpuri by the Delhi Development Authority of which the respondents got a vacant possession in 1972. The petitioner also required the disputed premises for his own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of the members of his family dependent upon him. The petitioner was living on the Barsati with seven members who have by now grown up. He, therefore, was is need of the first floor accommodation and did not own any other residential accommodation. The tenants contend that the Janakpuri flat had been alloted only to one of the respondents, namely, Mrs. Sheel Utpal, after the death of her husband, the original allottee. That too was let out long back without any objection from the landlord in 1972 itself and was no more available to them for occupation. The landlord was living on the second floor when he let out the premises in dispute to Brij Mohan. He has since then added two halls besides kitchen, latrine, bath-room etc. The petitioner has been letting out one of his flats on the ground floor both before and after the institution of the eviction petition. An objection was also taken with regard to the validity of the notice.

(2.) The learned Rent Controller held that the tenancy had been terminated by service of a valid notice. He further held that the acquisition of the flat in Janakpuri was only by one of the co-tenants and therefore, it could not provide a sufficient ground for eviction against the remaining co-tenants. found that his children have now grown up. As a matter of fact, the landlord filed the petition after he had let out the ground floor portion which had fallen vacant before the institution of the present petition. He was, therefore, of the view that it was not correct to say that the landlord had no other reasonably suitable accommodation and dismissed the petition.

(3.) Upon appeal, the learned Rent Control Tribunal upheld the finding that the ground under cl. (h) was not available upon the same reasoning as that of the learned Rent Controller. The learned Tribunal, however, allowed the landlord to succeed on the ground of bonafide personal requirment. The learned Tribunal staled that soon after the construction of the house in 1967, the landlord shifted to the top second floor while he let the ground floor and the first floor to different tenants because at that time his children were young and he coul manage with a Barsati, but now he felt the need for more accommodation for his growing family. He no doubt let out the portion of the ground floor before the filing of the first eviction petition inorder to have rental income on higher rent which he had a right to do. Even during the appeal, a portion of the ground floor had fallen vacant and the landlord let out the same at a higher rate. But, the flat on the ground floor did not suit the need of the landlord as he could not split up his family, some living on the ground floor and the others on the second floor. The first floor was, therefore, more convenient to him as as it was the closest to the portion already in his possession. The desire on the part of the landlord to have more rental incoms in the circumstances of the case was not considered malafide. "The opinion of the learned Tribunal was also influenced by the provision in sec. 19 of the Act that if the landlord did not occupy the premises in dispute for his own residence and let them out to earn more rent, th3 tenants wo aid have resovered possession. The appeal was allowed and the eviction decreed on December 20, 1977. Hence, this second appeal