RAM COPAL Vs. WASHESHWAR NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent Basheshar Nath filed a suit against the appellant Ram Gopal for eviction of the premises, a portion in house No. 854, Mohalla Haibatpura, Najafgarh, Delhi, on the basis of arrears of rent and bonafide requirement for his own use and the members of his family. Since an order under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (herefter the Act), was passed and complied with, the ground of non-payment of rent was not available, but eviction was directed on the second ground by the Add). Rent Controller on Augu,t 23, 1973. The tenant lost his appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal on November 18, 1977. Hence, this second appeal.

(2.) The first question that has been raised on behalf of the appellant is that the petition for eviction was not maintainable as the respondent-petitioner has failed to allege and prove that he had no other reasonable suitable accommodation available, which is one of the main ingredients of the ground under cl.(e) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14 of the Act. For this proposition, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Abdul Hamid and another vs. Nur Mohammad. 1976 R.C.J. 738. According to said cl. (e), three conditions are necessary for obtaining eviction, (i) that the landlord is the owner of the premises in question, (ii) that his requirement of the same for occupation as residence is bonafide, and (iii) that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. All the three ingredients must be alleged and proved. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, pointed out that the eviction petition has been entitled as one under sec. 14 (1) (a) and (e) of the Act. In para 4 thereof, the premises have been described as "Residential", and in para 18 (a) in the grounds of eviction, it has been stated that the premises which are residential and were let out to the respondent only for residence are required bonafide by the petitioner- landlord for occupation as a residence for himself and for the other members of his family including his sons who are members of the joint Hindu family with him. He has no doubt omitted to say that he had no other reasonably suitable accommodation, but that is implied under cl. (e) aforesaid, under which the petition has been made. This objection was not raised before the Addl. Rent Controller or the Tribunal. Otherwise, the petitioner would have amended his petition and rectified the defect. The respondent has also moved here on February 9, 1978, an application under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C., for amendment of the petition. In Rattan Lal vs. Vardesh Chander and others, 1976 R.C.R. 355, the Supreme Court observed that the Act contemplates no elaborate pleadings but filling out of particulars in a proforma which takes the place of a plaint. No specific averment of forfeiture and consequent determination of the lease was made in that petition. The Supreme Court held that having regard to the comparative informality of these proceedings and the quasi-judicial nature of the whole process, such an omission cannot be exaggerated into a lethal infirmity. In Dr. Hans Raj Dawar and another vs. Shyam Kishore, 1977 (2) R.L R. 253, it was observed that in view of Rattan Lal's Case (supra), the weight of the authority of Abdul Hamid (supra) had been shaken. This court in Smt. Sahabzadi etc. vs. Kaha Ram 1968 (2) D.H.C. Notes 169, C.R. 363-D of 1961, decided on May 27, i9b8, by 1.D. Dua, C,J., has held that pleadings had to be construed in a practical and rational way and a matter of form should not be permitted to defeat the cause of justice where the substance clearly brought out the essential facts affecting the rights of the parties. This is all the more so where the parties have not been prejudiced by such a construction of the pleadings. In Gurdial Nagdev v. Smt. Debi Bai 1979(1) R. C. R. 119, I had to deal with a similar problem. In that case also, the landlady had failed to aver that she had no other accommodation, but I held that fhe very fact that the premises in occupation were not sufficient in-plied that the other accommodation was really not available and there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of sec. 14 (1) (e). I had further said that the tenant had sufficient notice of the case set up by the landlady and both the parties knew well the points of controversy between them and no one was taken by surprise. It will be an improper exercise of discretion if the tenants were now permitted to raise such a technical objection. Moreover, failure to plead the ingredients does not necessarily result in dismissal of the petition. If the tenant had raised this objection in his written statement, the mistake could be rectified in time by an amendment of the petition. Though normally all the ingredients require to be alleged and proved but it does not mean that the letter of the law and not the spirit thereof must be complied with. When the petitioner moved the petition under Sec. 14(1) (e), it was implied very much that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

(3.) The learned counsel for the appellant then drew my attention to a document Ex. R-2, produced by him in the court of the Addl. Rent Controller. It is a statement alleged to have been made by the respondent before the managing officer on January 16, 1959, that he was in possession of plots Nos. 822,823, 824 and 825, in Najafgarh, jointly with his brother Hari Chand. House No. 854 is also joint with his brother for which rent has been paid. Though this statement was not put to the landlord-petitioner at the time of his examination, but according to Biswanath Prasad and others v. Dwarka Prasad and others, A. I. R. 1974 S.C. 117, a party's admission being evidence proprio vigore need not be put to him at the time he enters the witness-box and since the admission is a substantive and in certain circumstances conclusive piece of evidence, it was the duty of the petitioner to explain his admission when the documents were produced along with the written statement. This statement was not denied nor controverted. It proves, it was urged, that the respondent had other accommodation available. It is true that the landlord has not cared to explain the circumstances in which the admission was made several years ago, but the courts below have believed him when he said that he needed accommodation for himself and members of his family, and in the cross-examination, that the plots were not purchased by him but were purchased by his brother and he had no other building in his possession except 3 rooms and a store in the disputed house. Thus, he has proved that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Therefore, it will not be proper to disturb the concurrent findings arrived at by the courts below in this respect, vide Naqubai Ammal and others v. B. Shama Rao and others, A I. R. 1956 S. C. 593, and Nanak and others v. Basanta and others, A. I. R. 1976 All. 157. Now, there is no need to decide the application of the respondent for amendment of his petition so as to include the ingredient that he had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; the application is rejected.