LAWS(DLH)-1979-1-2

BENNET COLEMAN AND COMPANY LIMITED Vs. PREMCHAND JAIN

Decided On January 15, 1979
BEWIET COLEMAN AND COMPANY Appellant
V/S
PREMCHAND JAIN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) [Father of respondent 1 to 4 leased out tenanted premises to Bharat Insurance Co. in 1947. Latter allotted it to its sister concern, the appellant. On expiry of lease, appellant became a direct tenant on 1.2.56. Landlord on 30.4.66, terminated tenancy and on 30.7.69, sued for eviction on the ground of personal requirement and sub-letting. Controller orderd eviction on the ground of sub-letting. Tribunal upheld the order and appellant filed S.A.O.] After giving above facts judgment, pare 3 onwards is :

(2.) As regards the validity of the notice of termination of tenancy it was urged that the notice did not fulfil the requirements of sec. 106, T.P.A. and therefore, there being no valid determination of the tenancy, no eviction petition could be filed. Now, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, was enforced with effect from 9.2.59 and the T.P.A, 1882 was evtended to the Union Territory of Delhi on 1.12.62 while the lease in question had come into existence as early as 1.2.56. It raises a question whether any notice to terminate such a tenancy was at all necessary before a petition for recovery of possession of the premises could be instituted. In Pawada Venkat Rao Vs C. V. Ramana AIR 1976 SG 869 [1976 Rajdhani LR.J Supreme Court in connection with the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, referred to its earlier decision in Raval and Co. Vs K.G, Ramachandraan, AIR 1974 SC 818, and held that where the Rent Act provided the whole procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment, the provisions of sec. 106 of the T.P.A. had no relevance. It distinguishedangilal v. Sugan Chand AIR 1965 Sc 101, which had taken a contrary view in a case under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, that since under that Act the remedy of eviction was available by a civil suit, usual notice U/S 106 of the T.P.A. was necessary for the maintainability of the suit. It also approved Hem Chand v. Smt. Sham Devi, (1955) 57 PLR 441, which had held that no such notice was necessary for eviction under the Delhi and Ajmer Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947. There should be little doubt that the Delhi Rent Control Act was a self-contained Code and it had to be one such because when it was enacted, the Transfer of Property Act was not even in the field. Its provisions appear to be similar to the said Andhra Pradesh Act and also to the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, in respect of which no such notice was held to be necessary : vide Vinod Kumar v. Harbans Singh. AIR 1977 Pb. & Har. 262. By parity of reasoning I should think therefore that sec. 106 of tfie T.P.A. would not apply to the Delhi Rent Control Act. But, in Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander , AIR 1976 SC 588, decided three months earlier on December 9, 1975, it was held that a notice under sec. 106 of the T.P.A. was necessary before a petition under sec. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act could be filed even in respect of a lease that came about on May 19,1954. Now, there is an obvius conflict between ,the two Supreme Court decisions and the latter one should prevail even though the earlier decision specifically dealt with the Delhi Act. 1 should have made a choice but I leave the matter to be decided on some other occasion, for upon facts 1 consider that the notice in question substantially complied with the requirment of sec. 106 of the T.P.A.

(3.) The notice terminated the tenancy with effect from 1.6.66 yet demanded surrender of possession on 31.5.66, but fifteen days were made available and, therefore, the technicalities of sec. 106 of the T.P.A. need not effect the validity of the notice. As a matter of fact, it appears to me that the notice so served purports to terminate the tenancy with effect from the last day of May when the possession is demanded and it only purports to add that you are no more a tenant with effect from 1.6. 66 The objection to the validity of the noticeris not valid. The second notice served on Ap il 2, 1973, has no bearing on the case; vide Bhagbandas Agarwal v. Bhagwandas Kanu 1977 RCR 754.