LAWS(DLH)-1979-5-10

JAGAT TARAN BERRY Vs. SARDAR SANT SINGH

Decided On May 25, 1979
JAGAT TARAN BERRY Appellant
V/S
SARDAR SANT SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 raises an intricate question as to the validity of a notice to quit. An order for recovery of possession has been made by the Additional Rent Controller and confirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal. The notice to quit was of 15 days. The tenant contends that as the lease was for 'manufacturing purposes' the notice ought to have been of six months. There was no written lease deed executed by the parties; at least, none has been brought on record.

(2.) . The only other fact that need be mentioned is that for the few months that rent was paid, the payments were monthly. This is proved by the counterfoil of a receipt signed by the tenant. It shows that Rs. 400 was paid as rent for November, 1966. Admittedly, nothing was paid thereafter. The order for recovery of possession was sought and obtained on the ground that arrears of rent had not been paid since 1st December, 1966. In the course of the proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller, the defence of the tenant was struck out as he did not deposit the arrears of rent pursuant to an order under section 15(1) of the Act. That is why no argument has been advanced on the merits, and only the validity of the notice to quit has been questioned.

(3.) . The orders made below are not concurrent as to whether the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. The Additional Rent Controller held that such a purpose was neither alleged nor proved. But, the Rent Control Tribunal seems to have inferred that the premises were let for a manufacturing purpose from the fact that they were so used. Without so deciding, I will proceed on the assumption that the lease was for a manufacturing purpose. The problem is to reconcile section 106 and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Logically, section 107 should be read first because it states how leases are made, whereas section 106 prescribes by fiction the duration of various kinds of leases In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary'.