S. KUMAR Vs. OM PARKASH SHARMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition under Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by S. Kumar (tenant) seeking the revision of an order of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dated 28.1.1978 directing the petitioner's eviction from premises No. C-59 Narain Vihar, of a portion of which he was a tenant under the respondent (landlord).

(2.) It has been held that the provisions of the Rent Control Act regarding eviction of a tenant only supplement, and do not supplant, the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and do not relieve a landlord from showing that the prerequisite for seeking possession of the premises, as laid down in the Transfer of Property Act viz. that the relationship Mangilal v. Sugan Chand, 1965 AIR(SC) 101 Manujendra Dutt s case (2) and Rattanlal v. Vardesh Chander, 1976 RCR(Rent) 355 . Based on this position, the first contention of Sri Kumar the petitioner, (an advocate who appeared in person), was that the eviction should not have been ordered for the simple reason that there had been on valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, terminating the tenancy of the petitioner. In the present case, the tenancy agreement was dated 29.6.1975. The receipt (E.R. 1) executed by the landlord on date read:-

(3.) The first contention is clearly not maintainable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the landlord had clearly mentioned in para 14 of the application for eviction that the premises were let with effect from 1st July, 1975 and in his written statement the tenant did not contradict it and admitted that it was true that he moved into the premises on 1.7.1975. The plea that the tenancy had commenced on 29.6.1975 itself was not put forward. Secondly, it is clear from the wording of the receipt that when the tenant paid a month's rent in advance on 29.6.1975 it was for the month of July, 1975 thus making it clear that the tenancy was according to the calender month. In his evidence the tenant admitted that no rent had been paid for the last two days of June. Though he stated that this was because it was not asked for, it makes the position clear that the tenancy was only according to the English Calendar month. Thirdly, from the terms of the notice extracted earlier, it will be seen that it had provided for this contingency also and gave notice that in case the tenant contended that the tenancy terminated on some date other than the last date of the calendar month, the notice may be taken as terminating the tenancy with reference to that date.