(1.) The controversy raised in this second appeal from order under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958 has a very long and chequered history. It really highlights the frequent clashes between the landlords and tenants due to shortage of accommodation in Delhi and the consequential steep rise in rents. That educated and respectable landlords and tenants residing in different portions of the same building and expected as good citizens to possess a realistic sense of civil behaviour, should, instead of being close friends and helpful neighbours, be parties to criminal and civil litigation, arrayed on opposite sides, can hardly be a ground for paying a tribute either to their practical and balanced sense of social behaviour or to the conditions in our welfare set-up which breeds such situations This indeed is not the first case of its kind which this Court has had to deal with in recent times. Parties in such situations can scarcely have the requisite peace of mind, leave alone the mental worry, expenses, physical bothration and wastage of time to which they must find themselves to be subjected. In a welfare State like ours, where the fundamental right to property is guaranteed by the Constitution, and where, inter alia, making provision for adequate means of livelihood and decent standard of living are the fundamental principles laid by the Constitution in the governance of the country, one can legitimately look up to the authorities concerned to see that reasonably adequate provisions for decent residential accommodation for the citizens is provided, whether in the public or in the private sectors. The authorities have to be responsive to the human needs of the people. Neglect or undue indifference in this respect may only tend to foster bitterness between landlords and tenants and such hostile attitude between them is likely to have serious adverse impact on their good citizenship.
(2.) Turning to the facts of this case, the present application for eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement for residence of the landlord-owner and of his family members dependent on him was filed in November, 1964. Petitioner No. 1 is Krishana Kumar and petitioner No. 2 is his wife Radha Rani, it being stated in the application that petitioner No. 1 is the owner- landlord of the house, but the same was let out by his wife petitioner No. 2. In the previous litigation between the parties, according to the averments of the application for ejectment, it had been held that petitioner No. 1 was the owner-landlord. Petitioner No. 1, is, according to the application, a heart patient and needs the ground-floor very urgently. Previously, he had filed a petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide personal necessity, but the condition of his health was held not to be such as demanded immediate shift to the ground-floor. The ground of ill-health thus did not exist at the time of the previous application, but from July, 1964 onwards, according to him, he had serious attacks of heart trouble and this change in the situation necessitated initiation of the present eviction proceedings.
(3.) This prayer was successfully resisted by the tenant and on 28-12-1965, the learned First Additional Rent Controller disallowed the application for ejectment. The first point discussed by the learned Additional Controller was that of res judicata and after considering the earlier order of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court dated 31-7-1964, it was observed that it could not be said that the present petition was barred by the principle of res judicata because change in the circumstances had occurred. It was, however, added that in case the petitioner Krishana Kumar was able to prove that he had suffered from heart attacks after the termination of the previous litigation and that he had been advised by the doctors in a bona fide manner that he should not live on the first floor, then the psent plea for ejectment could not be considered to be barred by the principle of res judicata. It was in the circumstances a question of fact to be proved by the petitioner as to whether Krishana Kumar had suffered the two heart attacks as alleged by him and there was an advice by the doctors against his living on the first floor. It was in the background of this observation that the learned Additional Controller proceeded to consider the evidence on the record and came to the conclusion that the petitioners had failed to prove that Krishana Kumar was suffering from any heart disease or that he had been bona fide advised by the doctors to live on the ground-floor. The plea of the petitioners not being possessed of reasonably suitable accommodation was, however, held to be barred by the principle of res judicata because in the previous litigation, the accommodation in his possession was held to be more than reasonably suitable for him and for his family members. In the earlier proceedings, it had also been held that one of the petitioner's sons who was studying in England, was not dependent on him. That son had since returned to India, but the fact of his return to India was not considered in detail.