MADAN LAL Vs. COMETENT AUTHORITY SLUM AREAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition purporting to be made under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenges the validity of the order dated 5-12-1967 passed by the Competent Authority (respondent No. 1) under Section 19 (3) of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 as amended by Act 48 of 1964 (hereinafter called the Slum Act) granting permission to the landlord (respondent No. 2) to execute the order of eviction obtained by him against the petitioner tenant under proviso (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called 'the Rent Act').

(2.) The petitioner was a tenant in Shop No. 896 of which respondent No. 2 was the landlord. Respondent No. 2 alleged that the petitioner had sublet the shop and had parted with possession of it and was, therefore, liable to be evicted under proviso (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Rent Act. The eviction proceedings filed by respondent No. 2 under the Rent Act were resisted by the petitioner, inter alia, on the ground that the premises had not been sublet by the petitioner who had not parted with possession thereof. The Additional Rent Controller in an order dated 20-5-1965 at Annexure 'A' of the petition, however, held that the petitioner Madan Lal had parted with the possession of the shop and sublet the same at first to one Suraj Parkash, tea vendor and then to Nanu Ram, who sold ready- made clothes. He, therefore, passed an order for the eviction of the petitioner under proviso (b) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Rent Act. The appeal filed by the petitioner to the Rent Control Tribunal was dismissed by the said Tribunal by order dated 10-12-1965, which is at Annexure 'A' to the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No. 2 in the present case. Respondent No. 2 thereupon applied on 5-2-1966 to the Competent Authority under Section 19 of the Slum Act for permission to execute the order of eviction against the petitioner. A copy of the said application is at annexure 'B' to the writ petition. The petitioner filed a reply to this application before the Competent Authority on 18-7-1966 (copy at Annexure 'C' of the petition) again denying that he had sublet the premises or parted with possession thereof. He further said that he had removed Nanu Ram from doing stitching work in the shop and contemplated and intended doing his own business of printing cloth in the said shop. He was trying to manage funds for that purpose and he would start work for making both ends meet. He had large family to maintain and he was a poor man. If he were to be evicted he would bound to create a slum and would be thrown on the road. In a counter-affidavit filed on 2-1-1967 the petitioner again asserted that the premises were now in his possession and he was carrying on printing of cloth work therein. He requested that the premises may be got inspected by the Competent Authority. Respondent No. 2 replied to the application for inspection on 21-3-1967 to the effect that the Authonties of the Rent Act had already decided that the petitioner had sublet and parted with the possession of the premises. The allegation of the petitioner at this stage that he is in possession and occupation of the disputed shop is immaterial and cannot be considered by the Competent Authority. There was, thus, no need for inspection.

(3.) On these pleadings arguments were heard by the Competent Authority, who passed the impugned order dated 5-12-1967, which is Annexure 'H' to the petition, granting respondent No.2 permission to execute the order of eviction. The Competent Authority passed the question whether the respondent, if evicted, will create a slum and answered it as follows : "The respondent has, it has been held by the Rent Controller and the Tribunal, sublet the premises in dispute. The question of subletting cannot be reagitated here. It has been finally adjudicated upon by the Controller and the Tribunal.............. .Since the respondent is not in possession of the premises which is a shop, the question of his creating another slum does not arise. His status, therefore, loses all its significance. It is only looked into when there is question of acquiring alternative premises. ........ .Therefore, this question does not arise. This is a fit case where permission should be granted................" The learned counsel for the petitioner has attacked the above mentioned order by the Competent Authority mainly on the ground that the findings by the Authorities under the Rent Act were irrelevant for the consideration of the application for permission to execute the order of eviction under Section 19 of the slum Act by the Competent Authority. The learned counsel pointed out that under the various provisos to Section 14 of the Rent Act eviction of a tenant could be ordered on various grounds many of which would be quite irrelevant when the Competent Authority is considering the application under Section 19 of the Slum Act. For instance, the finding whether the tenant has been in arrears of rent would have no bearing on the question whether the order of his eviction should be executed or not. The Competent Authority should not have, therefore, taken into consideration the findings under the Rent Act that the premises had been sublet by the petitioner. The Competent Authority was bound to make an independent inquiry whether the petitioner was in possession of the premises at the time the application under Section 19 of the Slums Act was under consideration and the Competent Authority was bound to decide this application on its own merits irrespective of the findings given by the Authorities under the Rent Act. The Competent Authority is bound under sub-section (4) of Section \ 9 of the Slum Act to consider if alternative accommodation within his means would be available to the tenant. The Competent Authority in this case refused to make an independent determination of this question and simply relied on what was held by the Authorities under the Rent Act. In doing so it has acted contrary to the provision of section 19 (4) of the Slum Act and its order was liable to be set aside.