ZUBEDA KHATOON Vs. CAPITAL DRY CLEANERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant-landlord let out the Premises to the respondent-tenant which is an unregistered partnership firm. The tenant applied to the Rent Controller for fixation of standard rent under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter, called the Act). The landlord resisted the application on the ground that the proceedings initiated by the tenant were "to enforce a right arising from a contract" of tenancy within the meaning of section, 69 (3) of the Partnership Act and were, therefore, bar-red thereby. The Controller as well as the Rent Control Tribunal both held that the proceedings were not barred by section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act.

(2.) The sole question for decision, therefore, is whether the proceedings for the fixation of the standard rent under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 are "to enforce a right arising from a contract" within the meaning of section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act ?

(3.) The tenancy generally originates in a contract but also may come about by operation of law. The definition of "landlord" in section 2 (e) and the definition of "tenant" in section 2 (1) of the Act do not make it necessary that the tenancy between the landlord and the tenant must have been arisen from a contract. If, therefore, a particular tenancy has not originated in a contract at all, the application for the fixation of standard rent by a tenant would not have even the substratum of a contract underlaying it. But in the present case, the tenancy has originated in a contract. The learned counsel for the appellant-landlord has argued that the application for fixation of the standard rent is to enforce a right arising from a contract of tenancy. He mainly relied on section 4 (2) of the Act which states that "any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of the standard rent shall he construed as if it were an agreement for the payment of the standard rent only". The learned counsel would like to infer from this provision that the agreement regarding the payment of contractual rent is not entirely wiped out but is only modified by this provision and therefore, the fixation of the standard rent is still made in pursuance of a contract modified by the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision in Saifuddin Hussainibhoy v. The Burma Cycle Trading Co., 1968 AIR(Mad) 154 holding that a petition for eviction under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 was a proceeding for the enforcement of a right arising from a contract within the meaning of section 69 (3) of the Partnership Act