LAWS(DLH)-1969-4-37

MAHENDRA KUMAR KHANDELWAL Vs. PADAM CHAND JAIN

Decided On April 09, 1969
Mahendra Kumar Khandelwal Appellant
V/S
PADAM CHAND JAIN Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is the tenant, while the respondent is the landlord. The standard rent for the premises of the respondent, let out to the appellant, was fixed in a separate proceeding at Rs. 125 per month. The landlord filed a petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the tenant had failed to pay arrears of rent within two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent had been served on the tenant by the landlord within the meaning of proviso (a) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The tenant was served with the notice of eviction proceeding on 20.8.1968, after which he deposited an amount of Rs. 1,750/- in the Court of the Rent Controller other than the one in whose Court the eviction petition was filed by the landlord, the notice to which was also served on the tenant. On 1.9.1966 the Rent Controller in whose Court the eviction proceedings were pending made an order under Section 15(1) of the Act calling upon the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent and to pay the current and the future rent as contemplated by Section 15(1). The total arrears by that time had amounted to Rs. 2,440/- for the period ending 3.10.1966. The Rent Controller was of the view that the deposit of Rs. 1,750/- which had been made by the tenant was not valid to deprive the landlord of the cause of action for the application for eviction, inasmuch as it was made after the expiry of two months from the service of notice of demand served by the landlord on the tenant under proviso (a) to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. Unfortunately, the Rent Controller ordered the tenant to deposit all the arrears of Rs. 2440/- over again without taking into account Rs. 1,750/- already deposited by the tenant.

(2.) The tenant appealed against the order of the Rent Controller dated 3.11.1966. In the appeal, the Rent Control Tribunal passed an order on 26.11.1966 by which the operation of the order of the Rent Controller dated 3.11.1966 was stayed. The stay order passed by the Rent Control Tribunal on 26.11.1966 does not, however, appear to have been communicated to the Rent Controller. Consequently, on 6.12.1966 the Rent Controller struck off the defence of the tenant under Section 15(7) of the Act and ordered his eviction from the premises. On 18.5.1967 the appeal filed by the tenant against the order of the Rent Controller dated 3.11.1966 under Section 15(1) of the Act was dismissed as time barred. On 19.5.1967 the landlord applied for execution of the order of eviction. On 20.5.1967 the landlord withdrew the amount of Rs. 1,750/- which had been deposited by the tenant but which was not taken into account by the Rent Controller in passing the order dated 3.11.1966. The tenant filed objections under Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure, before the Rent Controller on 26.5.1967 pointing out that the order of the Rent Controller dated 3.11.1966 had been stayed by the Rent Control Tribunal, that the landlord had actually withdrawn the amount of Rs. 1,750/- deposited by the tenant and that it was incumbent on the Rent Controller to have given the parties an opportunity of leading evidence. The order of eviction passed by him was, therefore, null and void.

(3.) These objections were dismissed by the Rent Controller by his order dated 6.10.1967 on the ground that the stay order dated 26.11.1966 had not been brought to his notice and, therefore, the eviction order passed by him was not without jurisdiction. He relied on the recent Supreme Court decision in Mulrai v. Murti Raghunathji, 1967 AIR(SC) 1386. The order of eviction as not, therefore, a nullity. As an executing court, therefore, he could not go behind the order. The tenant's appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal was dismissed again on the ground that the stay order dated 26.11.1966 had not been intimated to the Rent Controller and, therefore, the order of eviction passed by him could not be said to be without jurisdiction.