(1.) C.M.22475/2019 (Exemption) Allowed subject to all just exceptions.
(2.) Some necessary facts which are required to be noticed for disposal of this appeal at the admission stage itself are that the respondent joined the services of the appellant-Bank on 21st August, 1982. He worked in various branches/offices of the Bank. An order of compulsory retirement was passed after he had put in 33 years and 2 months of continuous service. The respondent was served with a charge-sheet on 3rd November, 2014 and an inquiry was conducted into the matter. The disciplinary authority vide its order dated 6th October, 2015 imposed the punishment of "compulsory retirement" from services of the Bank. Post the passing of this order, a notice to show-cause dated 23rd December, 2015 was issued to the respondent as to why his gratuity be not forfeited. Being dissatisfied with the response of the respondent, an order dated 5th March, 2016 was passed forfeiting the gratuity of the respondent. The administrative order, as noticed above, was upheld by the appellate authority. However, learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition of the employee and set aside the order of the appellate authority and also the administrative order.
(3.) Mr. Taneja, learned counsel appearing for the Bank, submits that learned Single Judge has failed to take into account the nature of charge against the respondent. He contends that on account of the acts of the employee, his services were in fact terminated or put to an end as he was awarded the punishment of compulsory retirement. He submits that learned Single Judge has failed to take note of the fact that the word "termination" has to be given a broader meaning and also that after inquiry, the said punishment was awarded. In view of the nature of allegations, which stood proved, the respondent became disentitled to the benefits under the Gratuity Act. Strong reliance is placed by Mr. Taneja on Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Gratuity Act. While drawing the attention of this Court to the charge-sheet, Mr. Taneja has strongly urged before us that the services of the respondent were in fact terminated for the offence involving "moral turpitude" and such offence was committed by him during the course of his employment.