(1.) THE petitioners have sought interim measures from this court of restraining the respondents Mr. Ramesh Dass Khanna and Mr. Ganesh Dass Khanna in both the petitions from creating any third party interest or executing any sale deed qua property No. 4770/24, Bharat Ram Road, Daryaganj, Delhi. It is the admitted position that the parties pursuant to an arbitration agreement had submitted their disputes before an arbitrator Mr. P. N. Seth; the parties during the course of the arbitration proceedings arrived at a settlement, the terms whereof were recorded in a document titled Memorandum of Family Settlement dated 16th October, 2007; the arbitrator Mr. P. N. Seth on 20th October, 2007 in exercise of the powers under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 made an award in terms of the said family settlement. In terms of the said family settlement the respondents Mr. Ramesh Dass Khanna and Mr. Ganesh Dass Khanna were to make certain payments to the petitioners of which two installments have been paid and the other installments continue till 31st March, 2012; it was also agreed that to secure the said payments, the said respondents shall deposit the title deeds of their property aforesaid with the petitioners.
(2.) THE petitioners have instituted these petitions for interim measures to restrain the respondents from selling, alienating or encumbering the aforesaid property. Vide ex-parte order made in these petitions the respondents were so restrained.
(3.) THE aforesaid respondents have not filed any reply to these petitions. Applications aforesaid under Section 8 have been filed. It is the contention of the counsel for the respondents that the powers under Section 9 can be exercised only when an arbitration proceeding is contemplated. It is further contended that the petitioners have not stated that any arbitration proceedings are contemplated and have also not approached the named arbitrator. It is thus contended that the present petitions under Section 9 are barred by Section 8 of the Act. It is further contended that the award is executable as a decree under Section 36 of the Act and the remedy if any of the petitioners is to execute the award and not to approach this court under Section 9 of the Act. It is further contended that the Memorandum of Family Settlement in terms whereof the award aforesaid was made by the arbitrator itself in Clause 20 thereof provides for arbitration and if any disputes have arisen relating to the family settlement, the remedy of the petitioners is to approach the arbitrator and not this court under Section 9 of the Act. In fact the counsel for the said respondents had at the outset contended that these petitions be disposed of with direction to the petitioners to approach the named arbitrator in the Memorandum of Family Settlement aforesaid, under Section 17 of the Act. It is also informed that the said respondents have in fact already approached the said arbitrator in connection with certain other disputes which have arisen relating to implementation of the family settlement.