JAI PAL SINGH Vs. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition filed by the workman (the petitioner herein) is directed against an award dated 08. 10. 2004 passed by Mr. P. S. Teji, Presiding Officer, industrial Tribunal No. II, Delhi rejecting the claim of the petitioner for his reinstatement and back wages.

(2.) BRIEFLY stated the facts of the case relevant for the disposal of this writ petition are that the petitioner was employed as a Security Guard by the DDA (the respondent herein) on contract basis for a period of six months at a fixed salary. His appointment came in place pursuant to an agreement between the parties dated 31. 10. 1990. A copy of the said agreement is at pages 67-68 of the paper book. The period of six months for which the petitioner was appointed was to come to an end on 30. 04. 1991. However, before the contract employment of the petitioner was to come to an end, Delhi Pradesh Rajdhani Mazdoor Union of which the petitioner was a member filed a writ petition in this Court being and in that writ petition this Court vide its order dated 23. 04. 1991 directed the DDA to maintain status quo in relation to employment of the members of the Union. That status quo order dated 23. 04. 1991 continued till the abovementioned writ petition filed by the Union was dismissed vide order dated 06. 01. 1993. The DDA, after the status quo order was vacated, dispensed with the service of the petitioner in terms of contract of employment contained in the agreement dated 31. 10. 1990 w. e. f. 03. 03. 1993.

(3.) ON the date the services of the petitioner were dispensed with by the DDA, an industrial dispute being ID No. 72/1992 was pending before the Court regarding regularization of contractual employees of the DDA. Mr. H. P. Sahu learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that since an industrial dispute (ID No. 72/1992) was pending before the court below on the date services of the petitioner were dispensed with, the respondent was under an obligation to have obtained permission of the Labour Court under Section 33 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and failure to take permission by the dda vitiate the termination order of the petitioner. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that the impugned award of the court below suffers from perversity for non-compliance of Section 33 (1) by the management. Regarding compliance of Section 33 (1) of the Industrial Disputes act, 1947, the court below has observed as follows:-