BEG RAH Vs. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner entered into a contract with the respondent No.1 for execution of the work of setting up of brick kiln No.1 at Rohini and the said contract was executed between the parties. The said contract contained an arbitration clause being clause No.25, according to which all matters of disputes were required to be adjudicated upon by an arbitrator to be appointed by the Engineer Member of the respondent No.1. While executing the said contract certain disputes arose and accordingly the same were referred to the Engineer Member who, by his order dated 15th May, 1985 appointed the respondent No.2 as an arbitrator. The arbitrator entered upon the reference on 24.5.1985 and received evidence on record. Upon perusal of the statement, counter-statement and other documents, the arbitrator made and published his award on 23rd February, 1987. The aforesaid award passed by the arbitrator was filed in this court as against which objection under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act was filed by respondent No.1 which was registered as I.A.No.1619/88.

(2.) I have heard the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1/objector as also the counsel appearing for the petitioner. Although the objection has been submitted in respect of the entire award, counsel appearing for respondent No.1 mainly assailed the findings of the arbitrator in respect of claim No.1. In the light of the award passed by the arbitrator and the objection filed, I propose to dispose of the objection claimwise as follows:- CLAIM NO.1:

(3.) Claim No.1 relates to a claim for a sum of Rs.2,91,915.00 towards the short supply of bricks. On consideration of the evidence on record, the arbitrator found that the aforesaid claim is not justified. The arbitrator in his award has given four specific reasons for coming to the aforesaid conclusion as to why the aforesaid claim was not justified. Counsel appearing for respondent No.1 vehemently argued that the aforesaid reasons are no reasons at all and that , in fact, they are contrary to the actual and contractual position of the case. Counsel further submitted that the findings of the arbitrator are perverse and they are contrary to the terms of the agreement. Counsel referred to the provisions of clause 17 of the contract modified by letter dated 29th April, 1981. My attention was also drawn to the provisions of Clause 16 of the contract which provides that the payment for the supply of bricks to the permit holder would be only against the supply to be made by the kiln owner and the payments were to be made only at the time of supply and not in advance.